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ABSTRACT

Perkis, David F. Ph.D., Purdue University, December 2014. Energy Production,
Distribution, and Pollution Controls: Combining Engineering and Economic Analysis to
Enhance Efficiency and Policy Design. Major Professor: Wallace Tyner.
Three published articles are presented which focus on enhancing various aspects
of the energy supply chain. While each paper adopts a different methodology, all three
combine engineering data and/or techniques with economic analysis to improve
efficiency or policy design within energy markets.
The first paper combines a chemical engineering plant design model with an
economic assessment of product enhancements within an ethanol production facility.
While a new chemical process is shown to achieve greater ethanol yields, the animal feed
by-products are denatured and decrease in value due to the degradation of a key
nutritional amino acid. Overall, yield increases outweigh any costs, providing additional
value to firms adopting this process. The second paper uses a mixed integer linear model
to assess the optimal location of cellulosic ethanol production facilities within the state of
Indiana. Desired locations with low costs are linked to regions with high yield corn
growth, as these areas provide an abundance of corn stover, a by-product of corn and a
cellulosic source of ethanol. The third paper implements experimental economic
methods to assess the effectiveness of policies intended to control prices in emissions
permit markets. When utilizing reserve permit auctions as an alternative to setting
explicit maximum prices, prices are elevated beyond the theoretical predictions of the
model within the conditions of the experiment. The most likely cause of higher prices is
the negotiating power provided to sellers by grandfathering permits as evidenced by
higher than expected welfare gains to sellers.

xii
Before presenting the articles, a discussion is introduced regarding the role of
assumptions used by economists. For each article, a key assumption is highlighted and
the consequences of making a different assumption are provided. Whether the
consequences are large or small, the benefits of elucidating our models with assumptions
based on real world behaviors are clearly demonstrated.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

Scientific theories are distinguished from myths merely in being
criticizable, and in being open to modifications in the light of criticism. They can
be neither verified nor probabilified.
Karl Popper, Realism and the Aim of Science (Karl Popper, 1992)

Since the financial crisis of 2008, economists have been looking for answers as to
what went wrong with the banking system and the economy. While theories abound,
Nobel laureate Paul Krugman provides some wise insight when stating that “the
economics profession went astray because economists, as a group, mistook beauty, clad
in impressive-looking mathematics, for truth.” (Paul Krugman, 2009) Often hidden in
many of our mathematical equations are simplifying assumptions. If these assumptions
are incorrect but on the periphery of the problem at hand, then it is often not an issue. If,
however, there are incorrect simplifying assumptions which change some key aspects of
an economic problem, and other conclusions are built on top of these assumptions, then
many of these conclusions are likely to be erroneous.
The fields of energy and environmental economics lend themselves to combining
engineering and economic analysis to identify solutions to technological hurdles and
policy debates. Beyond simply lending technical data to the economist, research methods
in the engineering sciences can prove useful. While no one would expect any researcher
to provide a model that avoids the criticisms of an empiricist of the ilk of Karl Popper,
practiced engineers are often quite skilled at adopting simplifying assumptions while
maintaining a few essential necessary complexities which allow the model to represent
real world behavior.
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The three enclosed chapters each focus on a distinct issue related to optimizing
energy supplies in the United States through improvements in either productive
efficiency or policy design 1. Each chapter also depends on engineering and scientific
data to either describe or solve an economic problem. Finally, each chapter provides an
example of how a simplifying assumption could cause a researcher to go astray, whereas
an assumption based in real world behavior provides more reasonable results.

1.1

There are Few Representative Molecules

The first paper offers an economic assessment of a manufacturing process
intended to generate larger yields of ethanol and more value from corn (David Perkis et
al., 2008). The intent of the process is to transform distiller’s dry grains (DDGS), a byproduct of ethanol production used as a source of nutrition for hogs and cattle, into a
higher value feed by increasing protein concentrations. This would be achieved while
simultaneously extracting more pure ethanol from the DDGS. In this way, value would
be added to two product streams with the only added costs being those related to
additional capital and processing expenditures.
A combined chemical, engineering, and economic cost model demonstrates that
the value added from larger ethanol yields outweighs the added manufacturing costs.
However, when analyzing the new DDGS by-product via a nutritional assessment, it is
determined that in spite of larger protein concentrations, the value has been decreased.
The drop in value is caused by the disproportionate degradation of lysine, a key amino
acid in the nutritional profile of swine and hogs, due to the use of heat in the new
chemical process. In net, the new process still provides added value to large scale
production facilities, and subsequent energy supply streams, as the benefits of larger

1

Each chapter represents a copy of a peer-reviewed article already published in a journal or a set of
conference proceedings. Copyright approval has been obtained from each periodical. Citations are
provided in each section of this introduction, and any changes to the articles are restricted to formatting for
the purposes of this dissertation.
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ethanol yields outweigh both the manufacturing and denatured DDGS costs. However,
with the expectation that the DDGS would have been enhanced, the returns on investment
are not as lucrative as expected.
There is one additional learning from this research to which economists working
with engineers and physical scientists would be well served to heed: There are few
representative molecules. As economists, we often assume a representative agent, and
can often do so while generating very robust and rich results with our models. The
physical sciences are much less forgiving of such generalizations. As we see in this
paper, measuring the overall concentration of a general classification of molecules
(proteins and amino acids) yields different results than examining each molecule’s
nutritional contribution separately.
Subsequent to publishing, the combined engineering and economic model was
further modified for research in biofuel production technology assessment (Rakesh
Agrawal et al., 2008, Rakesh Agrawal et al., 2009) and policy design (Wallace E. Tyner
et al., 2010a, Wallace E. Tyner et al., 2010b). With regards to the latter, a stochastic
component was added to the model in order to assess a variable biofuel subsidy design in
comparison to the existing fixed subsidies in the market. It was determined that a
properly designed variable subsidy could enhance production value and decrease firm
risk while simultaneously lowering the cost of the subsidy to tax-payers.

1.2

The Social Planner vs. Profit Maximizing Firms

The second paper implements a cost minimization model in order to determine the
optimal locations for ethanol production facilities from cellulosic sources in Indiana
(David F. Perkis et al., 2008). The sources considered are corn stover, a secondary
residue from corn crops, and switchgrass, a primary crop requiring dedicated land. Costs
which are minimized include those covering the production and shipping of biofuel crops
up to the door of the conversion plant.
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Two very strong assumptions are adopted for the model. First, production
facilities are assumed to be capable of receiving either type of biomass. This would
require all facilities to have equipment which converts each type of biomass into a form
that can be chemically processed and fermented, and for the cost differential between
conversion processes to be negligible. Second, costs are minimized over the network of
plants consistent with a social planner’s framework. This requires decisions regarding
the location of manufacturing sites to be made simultaneously for all facilities in the
network.
Perkis et al. (2008) conclude the following regarding the optimal location of
manufacturing sites: (1) The probability of having a county with a site is somewhat
higher in the top half of the state where the highest yields of corn are produced, (2) Plants
in the northwestern section of Indiana use the highest percentage of corn stover and
obtain raw materials at the lowest cost, and (3) Plants operating in the southwestern
section of Indiana use the largest percentage of switchgrass and operate at the highest
cost. These conclusions were consistent over various plant sizes and corn stover removal
rate assumptions.
These conclusions are also consistent with what one observes within the industry
today. As some of the first cellulosic biorefineries begin production this year, they tend
to locate within corn-rich regions, utilizing corn stover pulled from nearby farmland
(Tom Doran, 2014). However, industrial practices are not entirely consistent with one of
the paper’s key assumptions, namely that most sites would process multiple sources of
cellulosic material. As manufacturing operations that utilize corn stover come online,
they tend to focus solely on this one raw material as their source of biofuel production.
Subsequent to publishing, the model was altered to more closely reflect the
assumptions of profit maximization (Appendix A). Instead of minimizing costs over the
entire network of locations simultaneously, sites would minimize costs on a rolling basis.
For instance, the first site would minimize costs with access to the entire resource base of
cellulosic materials. The second site would minimize costs without the raw materials
utilized by the first site, and so on. When changing assumptions from that of a social
planner to profit-maximizing firms, most sites utilize only one type of cellulosic material,
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with those first to market focusing on corn stover and those last to market focusing on
switchgrass. The main conclusions regarding plant location and cost ordering remain the
same.
While the assumption of the social planner did not impact the main results of this
paper, it certainly did impact the mixture of cellulosic materials being used by each site.
For studies where the proportions of biofuel sources are important, the social planner
assumption would lead to erroneous results. Therefore, in subsequent studies conducted
by colleagues who wished to use this model, the assumption of profit maximization was
adopted (Justin L. Quear, 2008).

1.3

Mathematical Predictions and Human Behavior

The third paper utilizes experimental economic methods to examine the
effectiveness of price controls utilized in markets which sell permits allowing firms to
emit greenhouse gases and other pollutants (David F. Perkis et al., 2014). Two types of
policies are compared in this analysis. The first type, referred to as a hard ceiling, places
a legal maximum on permit prices. The second type, referred to as a soft ceiling, releases
an additional reserve of permits into the market near the end of the regulated time period.
A hard ceiling provides absolute price control while the soft ceiling does not.
To further complicate issues, the mathematics of the soft ceiling requires firm
managers to use some foresight while trading by predicting market conditions and
optimal behavior when reserve permits are eventually released. If firm managers are
skillful in adopting foresight, their behavior should converge towards the theoretical
predictions of the soft ceiling model. The set of experiments presented were designed to
determine whether subjects trading in experimental markets regulated by a soft ceiling
would converge towards the price limit predictions of the model. If they do not, then
such policies should likely be redesigned and/or reconsidered before being passed into
law.
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The paper demonstrates that under certain conditions, the soft ceiling design does
not control prices as intended. In some cases, prices are higher than the desired
maximum even after subjects have been exposed to the same experimental market
structure over 12 repeated periods. One of the most likely culprits is the grandfathering
of permits which provides sellers with appreciable negotiating power. This is
demonstrated by large shifts in welfare from buyers to sellers in comparison to theoretical
predictions.
Regardless of the reason for the model’s divergence from theory, this research
highlights another issue prevalent within economics: some theories and policies that are
mathematically sound may not hold when subjected to the reality of human behavior.
In the natural sciences, experiments are easier to conduct. Engineers and
scientists are able to run controlled experiments with physical materials, keeping certain
factors constant and varying others. Economists have a more difficult task, as conducting
experiments requires working with human subjects as well as anticipating the factors over
which the economist has no control. Fortunately, with the growing number of
experimental labs within economics departments, more and more researchers are able to
test their ideas on a small scale (akin to an engineer’s pilot plant) before they are
implemented as policy.

In doing so, economists can modify their mathematical models

to account for human behavior and improve policy design before it is implemented on a
larger scale and passed into law.
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CHAPTER 2. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF A MODIFIED DRY GRIND ETHANOL
PROCESS WITH RECYCLE OF PRETREATED AND ENZYMATICALLY
HYDROLYZED DISTILLERS’ GRAINS

2.1

Abstract

A modification of the conventional dry grind process for producing ethanol from
yellow dent corn is considered with respect to its economic value. Process modifications
include recycling distiller’s grains, after being pretreated and hydrolyzed, with the ground
corn and water to go through fermentation again and increase ethanol yields from the
corn starch.

A dry grind financial model, which has been validated against other

financial models in the industry, is utilized to determine the financial impact of the
process changes. The hypothesis was that the enhanced process would yield higher
revenues through additional ethanol sales, and higher valued dried distiller’s grains
(DDGS), due to its higher protein content, to mitigate the drop in DDGS yields.
However, there may be no value added to the enhanced dried distiller’s grains (eDDGS),
even in light of its higher protein levels, as current pricing is expected to be more
sensitive to the amino acid profile than the total protein level, and the eDDGS has lower
lysine levels, a key amino acid. Thus, there is a decrease in revenue from eDDGS due to
the combination of no price change and loss of DDGS yield to ethanol. A 32% increase
in net present value (NPV) for the overall operation is expected when applying the
process modifications to a 100 million gallon ethanol plant. The financial improvements
are a result of the increased revenue from higher ethanol yields outpacing the sum of all
added costs, which include higher capital costs, larger loan payments, increased operating
costs, and decreased revenues from dried distiller’s grains.
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2.2

Introduction

The dry grind process converts the entire corn kernel into two main products of
economic value, ethanol and dried distiller’s grains (DDGS). While ethanol has typically
been known as a key component in alcoholic beverages, its rapidly growing use as an
automotive fuel, through subsidies and high oil prices, makes it a product of high value.
The DDGS co-product is sold as animal feed for swine, cattle, and chickens due to its
protein, amino acid, and energy content. However, DDGS also contains some
unconverted starch and sugar precursors to ethanol, which, if processed, could increase
the ethanol yield of a dry grind facility. Increasing ethanol yields would increase the
revenue from ethanol of the dry grind process, and could also enhance the value of the
DDGS by creating a product with higher concentrations of protein for animal feed.
A process has been proposed which takes the distiller’s grains from the
conventional dry grind process and recycles them for further processing and fermentation,
resulting in higher yields of ethanol and an enhanced dried distiller’s grains (eDDGS)
product with increased protein levels (Kim et al., 2007). The conventional process
(Figure 2.1), or “base” process, grinds the corn and breaks it down into simple sugars to
be fermented into ethanol. The ethanol is then separated by distillation off the top of a
column, while the bottom products are further processed to separate water from the
distiller’s grains. The proposed modifications (Figure 2.2) would subject the material
from the bottom of the distillation column to further processing, including a pretreatment
heating step and subsequent hydrolysis of polymeric sugars and residual starches by
enzymes, and then separate the sugar-rich “pretreated” liquid to be recycled back through
the original hydrolysis and fermentation processes in order to increase ethanol yields.
The remaining distiller’s grains not recycled with the pretreated liquid would be dried
and sold as eDDGS, an animal feed with higher protein levels than conventional DDGS.
A dry milling model, called the DM model based on dry milling of corn (Dale and
Tyner, 2006a), was developed using MS Excel (Microsoft Corporation, 2003) to monitor
the financial feasibility of the conventional dry grind process given market trends for the
costs of corn, the price of ethanol, and other product and input prices. Validation of this
model included comparisons of capital costs and variable costs against industrial
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estimates from the Ethanol Production Handbook (BBI Int., 2003) and a 2002 Cost of
Production Survey (Shapouri and Gallagher, 2005) respectively. In the 100 million
gallon nameplate range, the DM model calculated capital and variable costs valued at 97%
and 103% of their respective industrial estimates (Dale and Tyner, 2006a). Calculations
performed at other nameplate ranges were similarly close. Thus, there is confidence that
the DM model can be utilized to determine the financial feasibility of the conventional
dry grind process, and can be augmented with a technology module and adjusted pricing
to analyze the financial costs and benefits of the dry grind process with pretreated liquid.
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Figure 2.1 Schematic Flow Diagram of Current Dry Grind Ethanol Process. Water
Utilization for Cooling of Heat Exchangers Is Not Shown (Kim).
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Figure 2.2 Schematic Flow Diagram of Alternative Dry Grind Process with Recycle of
Distiller’s Grains (Wet Cake) to Liquefaction (Kim).

2.3

Methodology

The DM model is based on the process in Figure 2.1, which takes yellow dent
corn, hydrates the ground corn particles, breaks down the starch into simple sugars using
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enzymes, and then ferments the simple sugars into ethanol. The ethanol is then separated
from the remaining distiller’s grains, which are also processed in order to sell to the
animal feed market. The DM model takes specific flow rates (ethanol output, water
recycle), conversion rates (hydrolysis and fermentation yields), and product and input
characteristics (grain, ethanol, DDGS) to determine all other flows in the process (Dale
and Tyner, 2006b). Especially important are the product and process stream moistures,
as these determine how water is managed in the process, both in terms of drying capacity
and recycle use. With this information, all product flow rates and densities can be
estimated, allowing for equipment sizing, motor loads, and temperature and thermal
energy requirements.
Market prices for variable costs (grain, chemicals, energy, and utilities) and
revenues (ethanol, DDGS, CO2) are incorporated into the model to determine yearly
operating costs and benefits in real terms. The equipment sizing and specifications allow
for pricing of individual units to be determined. Equipment prices are scaled to the
current year by the Marshall Swift Index (chemical engineering, 2007). For large
nameplates such as this, the DM model uses the Fixed Capital Investment (FCI) method
to determine the Total Capital Costs (TCC) based on equipment costs (Dale and Tyner,
2006a). Working capital based on initial real operating expenses is added in, and the
resulting Total Capital Investment (TCI) is obtained. Part of this investment, as well as
any capitalized interest, is assumed to be financed through loans. Finally, interest and
discount rates are utilized to determine both nominal and real loan payments and perform
the final benefit-cost analysis to determine the financial measures of interest such as net
present value (NPV) and the internal rate of return (IRR).

2.3.1

The Base Process

The material balance for the conventional dry grind process (Kim, 2007) was
normalized by setting the ethanol output volume equal to the hourly flow rates assumed
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in the DM Model, and subsequently adjusting the starch and sugar conversion yields in
order to match the corn input rates of the material balance. Additionally, adjustments to
process flow moisture levels and backset recycle rates were made in the DM model to
match the material balance as closely as possible.
Once all the material and energy flows were determined based on this
normalization, prices were updated to represent current market values (Table 2.2).
Commodity prices were updated based on market pricing in the last week of May 2007.
Specialty chemical prices which typically show less volatility were updated using
information from industry obtained during the first half of 2007. As previously stated,
capital costs for equipment are automatically updated in the DM model with the Marshall
& Swift Equipment Cost Index, a commonly used engineering equipment inflation index.
In some cases, information from industry differed in that some equipment costs had
increased more dramatically than estimated by the Marshall & Swift Index, likely driven
by the increased demands on equipment by the ethanol industry. In such situations, the
equipment cost was inflated to more accurately represent prevailing market prices. The
DDGS price was also updated based on regional market prices, as opposed to being
estimated based on its historical relationship to corn or soy bean meal prices.
Once the base process model and all pricing was updated, loan terms were
determined and project financials were calculated.

2.3.2

Pretreated Liquid

A technology module containing the parameters of the pretreated liquid process
has been added to the base DM model in order to assess the financial impact of building a
plant with the pretreatment process. The module, as with the material balance, assumes
an equal rate of input corn, adjusting the remainder of the process flows with scaling
factors as indicated by the material balance (Kim et al., 2007). For instance, while the
pretreated liquid brings in more sugars to the fermentation process, increasing the
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requirements of yeast, it is assumed that no additional starches are introduced into the
liquefaction step with the pretreated liquid. Thus, the enzymes used in the base process
can be maintained at the same levels since they are tied to the starch flow rates coming
from the corn. Some rates increase such as the ethanol processing streams since higher
yields are obtained than in the base process. Finally, some of the rates decrease such as
the DDGS processing streams as more of the fermentable starches and sugars are
recycled. For water and thermal energy rates, it was assumed that these would be
consumed by the process at the same rate for each gallon of ethanol as the base process.
This is believed to be a conservative estimate as more savings would likely be realized in
the pretreatment process by recycling water and using effective heat exchange.
Existing equipment has been resized and new items are assumed to have been
purchased, including a saccharifaction tank for the enzymatic hydrolysis of the cellulose
and residual starch in the combined wet cake/thin stillage, and a centrifuge to separate out
the resulting pretreated liquid from the remaining distiller’s grains. Resizing is
performed based on the key operating parameters used for each piece of equipment. This
parameter is often as simple as the throughput, although some capital is sized based on
other factors, such as residence time or drying loads.
With flows rates and equipment sizing determined, market prices can be applied
to the pretreated liquid technology module just as in the base process. Loan terms are
then calculated and the financials for the pretreatment module are determined, such as
annual net benefits, NPV, and IRR.

2.3.3

Price Expectations for eDDGS and enzymes

While most market prices apply to both the base and pretreated liquid processes,
there are two additional components in the new process without a market price, the added
enzyme mixture and eDDGS. Prices for the new enzyme mixture are estimated by the
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supplier (Genencor International, Inc.) and are based on the additional ethanol yields (in
gallons) obtained in the new process.
It was expected that the higher protein levels in eDDGS would bring higher prices,
without having to pay a premium for the enzyme requirements of the pretreated liquid
stream. The eDDGS price is estimated based on the change in value compared to DDGS
as determined by a swine feed ration pricing model. The compositional analyses of
DDGS and eDDGS (Table 2.1) required for the pricing model were performed by the
Experiment Station Chemical Laboratories, University of Missouri-Columbia, following
methods outlined in a previous paper in this series (Kim et al., 2007).

Table 2.1 Total Swine Feed Nutrition Limits in Feed Cost Model for Swine Feed
Containing 15% DDGS or eDDGS.
MINIMUM
Crude Protein

0.160

App. Dig. Methionine+Cystine

0.502

App. Dig. Threonine

0.518

App. Dig. Tryptophan

0.144

Calcium

0.720

Available Phosphorous

0.240

Crude Fat

MAXIMUM

0.820
8.00

App. Dig. Lysine

0.850

Isoleucine

0.468

Valine

0.570

Vitamin Premix

0.150

0.150

A swine feed pricing model was chosen due to the strong dependence of swine
health on the amino acid and nutrient profile of swine feed (National Research Council,
1998). It is desirable that eDDGS would increase in value in all markets where it is
purchased, whether for cattle, swine, or any other animal which currently consumes
DDGS. Since initial analytical results showed a substantial increase in protein for the
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eDDGS, it was expected that this protein would yield higher value for eDDGS. As swine
do have a more particular diet based on specific amino acid levels (Thaler, 2002), it is
believed that value determinations based on the added constraints of a swine diet will
represent a true lower limit for eDDGS pricing in the market.
For the swine feed model, DDGS or eDDGS was assumed to be mixed into the
animal feed at a 15% level for grower swine. Because previous studies have shown that
dried distiller’s grains with fat content similar to that of standard DDGS can cause
reduced belly firmness and more soft fat when added at levels above 20% of a grower
swine’s diet, current recommendations entail starting the swine at 10% DDGS and
increasing the feed diet up to a maximum of 20% (Thaler, 2002). The midpoint of 15%
was therefore chosen for this analysis. However, several percentages were tested in the
model between 10% and 20% in an attempt to confirm the robustness of pricing estimates.
The swine feed model sets limits on amino acids (see Table 2.1), as well as total
protein and other minerals (National Research Council, 1998 and Hill et al., 1998).
Prices and nutrient levels are included for all other feed ingredients. The total feed cost is
minimized by adjusting corn, soy bean meal, vitamins, and amino acid supplements to
obtain the desired nutrient requirements at the lowest price possible, and a shadow value
is calculated for the DDGS. In this analysis, shadow values for DDGS and eDDGS were
obtained, and the ratio of the two shadow values was applied to the DDGS market price
in order to estimate an expected market price for eDDGS.

2.4

Results

Based on a dry grind nameplate level of 100 million gallons of ethanol, a corn
price of $3.82 per bushel, and a denatured ethanol price of $2.23 per gallon (Table 2.2),
the DM model predicts an NPV of $162 million (Table 2.3) over the 25 year life of the
project, with operations beginning in year 3. This includes a $33.5 million yearly net
operating benefit (Table 2.4), not including initial annual loan payments of $11 million
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(Table 2.3). The loan pays off 60% of the total capital investment of $148 million plus
any capitalized interest. The total capital investment per gallon of ethanol is $1.48.
While this number may seem somewhat low, some of the large capital investment values
found in industry may be due to a bubble from the growing ethanol demand. It is likely
that TCI values will soon return to lower levels more in line with our model. More
annual cost and revenue data can be found in Table 2.4.

Table 2.2 Key Prices and Economic Assumptions
(Price Data Taken from Chicago Board of Trade, Ethanol Producers Magazine,
Bloomberg.com, and other Industrial Contacts)

Value
Corn price

$3.82 / bu.

Soybean meal price

$217 / ton

Ethanol price

$2.23 / gal.

Gasoline price

$2.27 / gal.

DDGS price

$105 / ton

CO2 price

$6.36 / ton

Alpha-amylase

$5.50 / lb.

Gluco-amylase

$3.15 / lb.

Debt interest rate

8.7%

Debt/Equity ratio

60/40
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Table 2.3 Capital and Financial Analysis of the Base and Alternative Processes.
All Values in Real Dollars

Total Capital Investment
40% Equity Paid
Initial Loan Payment
IRR (real)
NPV
Change in NPV
% diff from base

Base Process

With Pretreatment

$148,260,425

$158,454,889

$59,304,170

$63,381,955

$10,901,732

$11,651,340

33.1%

38.5%

$161,957,921

$214,581,147
$52,623,226
32%
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Table 2.4 Annual Revenue and Operating Cost Details of the Base and Alternative
Processes

Revenues
Ethanol
DDGS or eDDGS
CO2
Total Revenue

Base Process
$223,000,000
$37,694,685
$2,004,506
$262,699,191

With Pretreatment
$251,254,754
$28,735,669
$2,271,200
$282,261,623

Costs

Base Process

With Pretreatment

Grain
Enzymes
yeast
SO2
denaturant
Energy and Water
Thermal
Electrical
H2O
Indirect
Labor
Taxes
Liscence Fees
Maintenance
Misc.
Total Operating Costs

$166,843,443
$136,176,590
$13,532,318
$1,018,105
$4,766,430
$11,350,000
$33,707,243
$25,576,643
$7,673,417
$457,184
$27,917,734
$6,553,650
$8,234,656
$5,253,984
$5,253,984
$2,621,460
$229,165,569

$171,035,283
$136,176,590
$16,066,376
$1,056,774
$4,947,464
$12,788,078
$39,552,795
$29,602,759
$9,434,927
$515,110
$30,813,358
$7,017,489
$9,698,408
$5,645,232
$5,645,232
$2,806,996
$241,401,436

Net Benefits

Base Process

With Pretreatment

without loan

$33,533,622

$40,860,187

Materials
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2.4.1

Pretreatment Module: Pricing Adjustments

The new enzyme mix cost is estimated to add $0.20 per additional gallon of
ethanol above 100 million gallons. With 12.7 million gallons of additional ethanol being
produced by the pretreatment process (Table 2.5), there are roughly $2.5 million in
additional enzyme costs.

Table 2.5 Input and Output Rate Changes of Major Ingredients between the Alternative
Process and the Base Process

Yellow Dent Corn (tons)
Ethanol (gal)
DDGS (tons)

Base Process

With Pretreatment

998,143
100,000,000
358,997

998,143
112,670,293
277,951

eDDGS drops in value roughly 1.5% compared to the base DDGS currently in the
market as determined by the swine feed model. This drop is due to the loss of lysine in
the eDDGS samples. Our base DDGS has 0.87% digestible lysine while the eDDGS has
0.54% (Table 2.6). Lysine is a key ingredient in swine feed (Thaler, 2002), and such a
drop forces the model to supplement the feed with higher cost, lysine rich components
and supplements, resulting in a very slight drop in value of the eDDGS. If the lysine to
protein ratio were to stay the same, we would predict an eDDGS lysine level of 1.27%
and an increase in eDDGS value of 6.7% vs. the base DDGS.

2.4.2

Pretreatment Module: Process Flows, Capital, and Operating Costs and Revenue
The ethanol yield increases with the pretreatment module by 12.7% (Table 2.5).

This has a substantial impact on plant revenue, increasing revenue by over $28 million
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annually due to ethanol yields alone. A couple of other notable changes are driven by
this yield increase. All ethanol processing equipment is more expensive due to the
increased throughputs, and the utilities are more expensive as well, as energy and water
increase in cost from $33.7 million to $39.6 million (Table 2.4).

Table 2.6 DDGS and eDDGS Nutrient Analysis
DDGS
Crude Protein

28.3

%

eDDGS
41.2

%

App. Dig. Methionine+Cystine

1.08 %

1.14 %

App. Dig. Threonine

1.08 %

1.33 %

App. Dig. Tryptophan

0.19 %

0.21 %

Calcium

0.031 %

0.035 %

Phosphorus

1.07 %

1.20 %

Available Phosphorous

0.92 %

1.02 %

Crude Fat

14.5

%

14.7

%

App. Dig. Lysine

0.97 %

0.58 %

Crude Fiber

6.52 %

2.88 %

Isoleucine

1.13 %

1.53 %

Valine

1.48 %

1.94 %

While the ethanol yields drive up the throughput and prices of certain pieces of
equipment, other capital expenditures are unaffected, or even decrease, due to the new
process flows. For instance, the hammer mill cost would be identical due to the constant
corn input rates (Table 2.5). Similarly, the costs of liquefaction and saccharification
tanks would increase minimally as the pretreated liquid stream does not increase
throughput in these two tanks substantially. In the case of eDDGS drying and processing,
the lower yields actually lessen the capacity requirements of the drum dryers, resulting in
a decrease in capital costs through this part of the process. The net result is that the
pretreatment process module increases the equipment costs for existing equipment by just
over $750 thousand, with another $1.4 million needed for the new equipment in the
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process (Table 2.7). These two increases lead to a total capital investment (TCI) of
$158.5 million, or a 6.9% increase in TCI compared to the base process. With the
ethanol yield increasing by 12.7%, an efficiency in TCI per gallon of ethanol is realized
as this value decreases from $1.48 in the base process to $1.41 in the pretreated liquid
process.

Table 2.7 Capital Costs for the Base Process and Alternative Process

Total Existing Purchased Equipment
New Purchased Equipment
Other Capital Costs and Working Capital
Total Capital Investment
Total Capital Investment / Gallon Ethanol

Base Process

With Pretreatment

$30,015,719

$30,782,203
$1,357,896
$126,314,789
$158,454,889
$1.41

$118,244,707
$148,260,425
$1.48

Finally, the decrease in eDDGS yields, with no appreciation in its value, results in
a revenue loss of nearly $9 million annually (Table 2.4), diminishing some of the revenue
gains from the ethanol.

2.4.3

Pretreatment Module: Financials

The loan payments increase for the pretreated liquid process, due both to
increases in capital requirements, as well as increases in working capital (based on
operating costs tied to higher values for capital and ethanol revenue). However, with the
lower capital cost per gallon of ethanol, and the large increase in ethanol revenue, it is not
surprising that the NPV for an operation which includes the pretreatment and enzymatic
hydrolysis technology is $214.6 million, or a $52.6 million increase compared to the base
process (Table 2.3). The IRR also increases to 38.5%, compared to 33.1% for the base
process.
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2.4.4

Sensitivity to eDDGS Pricing

If any variability exists with respect to lysine losses in the distiller’s grains due to
the pretreatment technology, it would be useful to understand the impact on the plant
financials. Assuming no loss of lysine in the protein, and an eDDGS lysine level of
1.27%, the adjusted value of eDDGS (a 6.7% increase instead of a 1.5% decrease) yields
an NPV of $230.7 million, or $16 million higher than the estimate with the lower eDDGS
value.

2.4.5

Sensitivity to Enzyme Mix Pricing

The enzyme mixture which hydrolyzes the pretreated distiller’s grains by far
represents the most significant raw material cost increase, and brings an additional $2.5
million in material costs to the operation. Without this added cost, the net operation
benefits of implementing the pretreatment and hydrolysis of distiller’s grains is $9.9
million. Thus, added enzyme costs cut into this net benefit by 26%. Looking at the
sensitivity of pricing for the enzyme mixture, a decrease in the new enzyme mixture cost
by 20% would yield a net yearly benefit of $7.8 million and an NPV of $218.2 million
compared to $7.3 million and $214.6 million respectively for the assumed pricing.
However, if the enzyme mixture cost ended up being higher by 20%, the net yearly
benefit and NPV would drop to $6.9 million and $211.0 million respectively.

2.5

Summary and Conclusions

Based on the conservative practice of utilizing swine feed models to determine the
value of dried distiller’s grains, the eDDGS product does not show an increase in value as
anticipated compared to the base DDGS due to the loss of lysine through the pretreatment
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and enzymatic hydrolysis processes, lysine being a particularly important amino acid in
the swine diet. While using a swine diet might seem restrictive as other animals may
benefit more from the high protein content in eDDGS, it is not known whether such a
product differentiation is possible in the DDGS market, being able to sell the product for
one type of animal feed at a premium while eliminating other markets. Thus, the
restrictions of a swine diet may be appropriate. If this is the case, then finding ways of
retaining lysine could prove important. While the value of eDDGS did not decrease
substantially compared to the base, further losses of lysine could drop the value enough
that overall feed costs become prohibitive to the farmer, and eDDGS loses more of its
worth to the swine population.
Nevertheless, even with the eDDGS value not appreciating, the pretreatment
technology does add value to a conventional dry grind operation at current corn and
ethanol prices. The large yield increases in ethanol, combined with its value over that
yield, increases revenues substantially, more than making up for added capital costs,
higher operating costs, and revenue losses from decreased DDGS yields. Thus, at current
ethanol prices, the economics of the pretreatment technology are encouraging, and
finding a way to maintain lysine levels in the dried distiller’s grains would likely make
the technology even more economically attractive. Furthermore, any reductions in
pricing of the enzyme mixture are shown to add to the economic gains of the
pretreatment and hydrolysis process. It is also known that lower ethanol prices would
reduce the gains of hydrolyzed distiller’s grains substantially. For instance, given the
assumptions used in this analysis, the breakeven ethanol price for the pretreatment
process is roughly $1.95 per gallon compared to $1.99 per gallon for the conventional dry
grind process. Any changes which either increase the value of the eDDGS or decrease
the cost of the enzyme mixture would help to lower this breakeven price even more, thus
making ethanol production by the dry grind process feasible over a larger range of
ethanol prices.
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CHAPTER 3. SPATIAL OPTIMIZATION AND ECONOMIES OF SCALE FOR
CELLULOSIC TO ETHANOL FACILITIES IN INDIANA

3.1

Abstract

Based on cellulosic biomass yield projections of a recent national study, the
optimal spatial distribution and size of cellulose to ethanol conversion facilities is
determined for cellulose sources in Indiana to be converted to ethanol through a
biochemical conversion process. Such sources include corn stover and switchgrass. A
cost minimization approach is implemented that optimizes over the raw material and
transportation costs of the process, with economies of scale included for large facilities.
Due to the abundance of corn stover and its current low cost as a byproduct of corn
production, a high concentration of facilities in the northwest section of Indiana is ideal.
Such plants would utilize high levels of corn stover and operate at relatively lower cost
than other facilities in the state. Other regions of the state would have fewer facilities,
several specializing in switchgrass and operating at a higher cost. Economies of scale
similar to those found in corn to ethanol facilities are likely to support large sized plants
given current yield projections. However, if more conservative biomass yield projections
are expected due to lower collection or land utilization rates, the economies of scale
needed to support large plant sizes nearly doubles, increasing the likelihood of an optimal
strategy in which smaller facilities are more broadly distributed around the state.
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3.2

Introduction

Ethanol output has grown significantly in recent years, both in Indiana and across
the United States. With the desire to promote cleaner, renewable fuels, both the federal
and state governments have instituted subsidies intended to increase output. In December
2007 Congress passed and the President signed the “Energy Independence and Security
Act of 2007” which contains a renewable fuel standard (RFS) requiring 35 billion gallons
of ethanol by 2022, of which at least 16 billion must come from cellulosic sources (U.S.
Congress, 2007). Additionally, recent increases in gasoline prices compared to the
historically low prices experienced in the United States likely will continue to put upward
pressure on the demand for substitutes. As less expensive production technologies in
ethanol manufacturing come online, ethanol substitution levels in fuel mixtures may
continue to increase.
While there is much excitement about this ethanol boom and the potential for
profit, there are also undesirable outcomes for participants in closely related markets.
Specifically, with corn being the primary input for the ethanol production process,
livestock producers dependent on corn as a feed ingredient have been negatively
impacted by rising corn prices. Such factors also impact food markets as higher costs for
feed are passed on to consumers of chicken, eggs, dairy, beef, and pork through higher
prices. Thus, while ethanol shows great potential as a cleaner fuel that could decrease
U.S. dependence on foreign oil, there are concerns about how increased ethanol output
levels and the induced demand for corn will impact the affordability of certain dietary
staples.
Given the potential for adverse price effects in food markets, there is a desire to
develop alternative sources of the raw materials needed for ethanol production. Materials
rich in cellulose show great potential as ethanol feedstocks. Not only can they be
converted to the necessary precursors for ethanol production, but many cellulose sources
are natural by-products of other farming and manufacturing processes. Corn stover and
wood trimmings are two common examples of by-products of corn farming and logging
respectively (Perlack et al., 2005). Furthermore, some high energy sources of cellulose
that would be grown as primary crops can be grown on terrains hostile to corn and other
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crops, thus in some cases being produced on currently uncultivated lands without having
to displace food production.
Recently, the “Billion-ton” study investigated the potential for U.S. grown
biomass sources to provide enough ethanol to replace 30% of domestic fuel consumption
(Perlack et al., 2005). In short, the authors conclude this would be feasible, with
cellulose based sources making up a substantial portion of the over 1.3 billion dry tons of
biomass resources projected to be available for conversion to fuels.
The State of Indiana has benefited from the push for ethanol and other biomass
based fuels. The large quantity of farmland dedicated to growing corn has made Indiana
an attractive site for the construction of conventional corn to ethanol dry grind
manufacturing facilities. With the push for alternative biomass to produce ethanol, it is
useful to begin assessing how Indiana can position itself to take advantage of cellulosic
materials if the Billion-ton study projections are correct. The Billion-ton study
anticipates that 18.3 million dry tons of cellulose feedstocks would be available in
Indiana given proper land utilization. As these sources are developed, and firms begin to
construct facilities for conversion to ethanol, there will be many questions affecting the
welfare of firms and citizens alike. For instance, where should manufacturing facilities
be located and how large should they be? Which locations will best take advantage of the
cellulose source materials with respect to minimizing costs? What impact will a
potentially large network of facilities have on our roads and highways? What will be the
impact of new manufacturing facilities and some newly cultivated land on the Indiana job
market and the environment?
The intent of this paper is to begin to answer some of these questions and to
provide a framework for follow-up studies. Specifically, it seeks to determine an optimal
spatial distribution of ethanol plants within the state of Indiana given the projections of
biomass availability projected by the Billion-ton study and detailed cost information for
harvesting, storing, and shipping biomass products (Brechbill and Tyner, 2008).
Additionally, this paper provides guidance regarding the optimal size of ethanol facilities
based on economies of scale. One of the key assumptions is that conversion facilities
will use all of the cellulose materials grown within Indiana, and only these materials, in
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the production of ethanol. This is acknowledged to be a strong assumption, but one
which should not dramatically alter the findings of the study. Since crop costs grow with
increased shipping distances one would expect that only crops near the borders would be
shipped across state lines, and there is no reason to believe that more crops would be
shipped in one direction or the other. It is therefore believed that the impact of this
assumption on the conclusions should be small.
Projections of optimal plant locations have been made in the past. Notably,
Nelson projected plant locations across Indiana for 40 equal output sites (Nelson, 1981).
However, Nelson focused on agricultural residues without taking into account cellulose
source crops which are specifically grown for conversion to ethanol. Additionally,
Nelson made regional assumptions of harvest rates not required here due to the detailed
county level data provided by the Billion-ton study. Given expected residue and crop
outputs in this data, a specific county level analysis can be performed by combining the
yield data with inter-county distances and transportation costs. Additionally, this paper
considers some of the larger throughput rates anticipated to benefit from economies of
scale based on historical experience from fermentation of corn-based sugars (Dale et al.,
2006).
Another series of papers exemplified by English et al. (2000) has a broader scope
by investigating the impact of corn stover and other biomass output expectations on the
economies of several corn-growing states including Indiana, even including output prices
and other factors for sensitivity analyses. However, English et al. focuses on economy
wide results at the state level as opposed to county level output decisions, the main focus
of this paper’s spatial distribution plan. Additionally, this paper utilizes the most recent
county yield estimates (Billion-ton study) and biomass cost information (Brechbill and
Tyner, 2008) for Indiana.
This paper will focus on the anticipated 14.6 million dry tons per year of corn
stover and switchgrass available to be processed by biochemical conversion (Perlack et
al., 2005). This process breaks the cellulose down to simple sugars using enzyme
hydrolysis, and then ferments the sugars to produce ethanol. Enzymatic hydrolysis and
fermentation are currently used to convert corn to ethanol and would be conducive to the
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cellulose sources considered in this study. These sources are corn stover, an agricultural
residue from corn production, and switchgrass, a high energy primary crop (US DOE,
2006). In addition to considering the optimal spatial distribution and size of plants given
the projections of the Billion-ton study, an additional scenario will be tested making more
conservative assumptions with respect to collection rates of corn stover, as well as land
utilization and biomass conversion rates for both corn stover and switchgrass.This is the
second page of your chapter.

3.3

Methodology

Focusing on biochemical conversion facilities, it is assumed producers can utilize
one of two plant sizes, a large plant (100 million gallons/year) or a small plant (50
million gallons/year), in order to convert Indiana’s projected corn stover and switchgrass
into ethanol. It is also assumed that this conversion process will be robust enough to
handle either of the two feedstocks in varying proportions within one plant. While this
might assume an optimistic level of manufacturing robustness, the key components of
each material which are hydrolyzed are similar. It seems feasible that enzyme mixtures,
as well as technological modifications of the crops themselves, could be developed to
provide such robustness. Finally, the following simplifying assumptions are made: (1)
each county will have at most one manufacturing facility, (2) the construction and
operating costs are identical for each plant except for the biomass raw material costs and
an economy of scale factor which will be represented by an added per gallon cost for the
smaller plant, and (3) cost differences exist only in the growing (switchgrass), harvesting,
and transportation costs of the biomass raw material mixture which is input into the
process.
The objective for firms is to maximize their profit, which is revenue less costs.
Since plants of modest size are assumed, individual plants should not have an impact on
the price of ethanol and unit revenues are thus assumed to be identical for each site
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regardless of its location. Thus, to maximize profits, firms must focus on minimizing
their costs. Since construction and operating costs are assumed to be identical for each
site, optimization focuses on the production, harvesting and transportation costs of
biomass. Specifically, how do the relative costs for each crop impact the choice of the
input mix in order to minimize costs.
This model will assume that costs are minimized over all sites, even though each
site may be owned by a different enterprise. While this appears to be more of a central
planning solution than one of competitive firms maximizing profits, the general results
should be similar, with plants locating based on the comparative advantages relative to
surrounding counties (Nelson, 1981). In reality plants will likely contract for cellulose
raw materials before the plant is even constructed. The early plants will locate in least
cost areas and will contract for available raw material in those areas. Since the purpose
of this exercise is to determine the use of all biochemically converted cellulose sources, it
is assumed that the price of ethanol is sufficiently high that all plant sites are constructed
and able to make a positive profit. Otherwise, not all sites would be constructed and
continue operating. As sites are constructed to convert the total supply of materials, firms
acting competitively will locate in order to minimize total costs.
The amount of dry biomass shipped between counties is designated Xijk, where i
is the set of counties where biomass is produced, j is the set of counties where ethanol is
potentially produced, and k is the set of biomass feedstocks (corn stover and switchgrass).
The relevant parameters for the cost minimization model are as follows:
pk – production cost for biomass feedstock k ($/dry ton shipped with profit)
sk – fixed shipping cost for biomass feedstock k ($/dry ton shipped)
f – freight rate for shipping biomass ($/dry ton shipped/mile)
dij – distance from county i to county j (miles)
Cp – added plant cost for a 50 Mgal facility (reflecting diseconomies of scale)
N – total plant capacity needed (100 Mgal/year)
l – fractional storage loss of biomass feedstock
bik – amount of biomass k produced in county i (dry tons/yr)
ck – million gallons of ethanol per dry ton of biomass
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The binary (0-1) variables Ij50 and Ij100 represent the number of 50 million and 100
million gallon ethanol plants respectively in county j, and the model is optimized by
minimizing the total cost C as follows:

min C = ¦¦¦ pk  sk  fd ij xijk  ¦ I 50j C p
50

100

xijk , I j , I j

i

j

k

j

subject to:
1
100
I 50
¦
j ¦Ij
2 j
j

N

(1)

100
I 50
d 1 for each j
j Ij

(2)

¦ xijk d (1  l )bik

(3)

for each k and i

j

¦¦ ck xijk t 50 I 50j  100 I 100
j
i

for each j

(4)

k

xijk t 0 for each i, j, and k

(5)

I 50
j

0,1 for each j

(6)

I 100
j

0,1 for each j

(7)

The optimization problem has several constraints. Constraints 2, 6, and 7 imply that any
county can have at most one plant of either size, 100 Mgal or 50 Mgal, and that fractional
plants are not permitted. Constraint 1 requires that the total amount of ethanol produced
will exactly exhaust the feedstock resource base. Finally, constraints 3, 4, and 5 require
that the amount of biomass supplied by a county cannot exceed the amount available
from the farms in that county after taking collection/storage losses into account, and the
amount of biomass supplied to each manufacturing site must be sufficient to cover the
production level. The problem is implemented using GAMS version 22.5 (Brooke et al,
2005).
To determine the sensitivity of the model to biomass availability and total
statewide ethanol output levels, several of the strong assumptions of the Billion-ton study
are relaxed in a second application of the model, with each adjustment of assumptions
resulting in lower ethanol yields for Indiana in what is considered a more conservative
scenario. For instance, our base case assumes that all cropland is managed with no-till
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methods. When this assumption is relaxed, corn stover recovery rates drop from 70% to
52.5% (Table 3.1). Additionally, land utilization rates for the base case are assumed to
be 100% whereas a rate of 75% in the second application recognizes that land owners
may choose not to participate. Finally, conversion rates are decreased in the second
application to reflect technical inefficiencies which are likely as manufacturing facilities
begin to convert cellulosic biomass to ethanol for the first time (Tiffany, 2007).

Table 3.1 Indiana Ethanol Supply Capabilities from Major Cellulosic Sources
Billion-ton Projection
Corn Stover
Switchgrass
Projected yearly dry tons of
biomass
Corn Stover clearance %
Land-use rate
Adjusted yearly dry tons of
biomass
Storage losses
Ethanol conversion
(gal/dry lb biomass)
Volume ethanol
(gal/year)
Total volume ethanol
(gal/year)
Total ethanol assumed
(gal / year)

Conservative Estimate
Corn Stover Switchgrass

9,887,958

5,348,497

6,206,723

5,348,497

70%
100%

N/A
100%

52.5%
75%

N/A
75%

9,228,761

5,348,497

3,258,530

4,011,373

8.4%

8.4%

8.4%

8.4%

81.4

79.0

69.7

67.6

688,118,569

387,038,637

208,041,476

248,574,327

1,075,157,206

456,615,803

1,050,000,000

450,000,000

Data sources: Projections are taken from the Billion-ton study with no till methods,
adjusting for a 70% corn stover harvest rate as opposed to 75%. Conservative estimates
are taken from the Billion-ton study with current tillage methods, adjusting for a 52.5%
corn stover harvest rate as opposed to 75%. Ethanol conversion figures are taken from
McLaughlin, 1999 and Spatari, 2005 for the projects and from Tiffany, 2007 for the
conservative estimate. Storage losses are calculated (see notes for Table 3.2).
Experience has shown that corn dry grind facilities are typically sized between 20
and 100 million gallons, with plants producing at or over 80 million gallons reaping most
of the economies of scale associated with capital expenditures (Dale et al., 2006). On a
dry cellulosic biomass input basis, there is some evidence suggesting that economies of
scale might be optimized when crossing over 2,000 metric tons per day, roughly equating
to 65 million gallons per year (Huang et al., 2006). The plant sizes of 50 and 100 million
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gallons are chosen for simplicity. Aside from the belief that these will aptly represent the
low and high economy of scale regimes, the fact that 100 is divisible by 50 provides
some interpretive benefits to the model. Namely, investors deciding upon a single 100
Mgal plant or two 50 Mgal plants will have to weigh the tradeoffs between the economy
of scale benefits of a larger plant and the reduced transportation costs associated with
distributing production sites more broadly.
Given these plant sizes, assumed conversion rates, and the resource constraints,
the maximum amount of ethanol expected to be produced in the base case is
1,050,000,000 gallons per year (Table 3.1). This number is very high compared to
estimates developed in other papers which apply further constraints beyond the billionton study based on several present day realities. The recent work of Brechbill and Tyner
(2008) is one example. Using the assumptions of the second application will allow for
the effects of biomass density to be tested, as 450,000,000 gallons are expected to be
produced annually given the more conservative estimates of this scenario.
The costs being minimized are a combination of raw material costs, transportation
costs, and economy of scale costs (the added cost of operating a small plant). Because
corn stover is a residue, the cost of growing corn stover is only the marginal cost of
additional fertilizer applied because of nutrients lost when the stover is removed. For the
base case, harvesting, handling and storage costs are added, taking storage losses and a
15% profit premium into account, to provide a product cost of $33.68 per dry ton of
shipped material (Table 3.2). Harvesting costs assume a corn stover clearance level of
70%, with 30% remaining on top of the soil past the harvest. Bales are net wrapped to
minimize costs during handling. Fixed and variable transportation charges are applied at
a rate of $2.20 per dry ton and $0.15 per dry ton-mile respectively. Miles are measured
as the distance between the county of the farm and the county of the plant. This cost
takes into account the round trip between the farm and the manufacturing facility.
Similar estimates using the conservative assumptions of the second case can also be
found in Table 3.2.
Switchgrass is grown as a primary crop, and therefore requires seeding and
establishment costs not present for corn stover. Additionally, a land rental fee is assumed
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to represent the value of the land’s next best alternative use. Adding these costs together
with the harvest and storage costs, and assuming a 15% profit premium, results in a raw
material cost of $52.95 per shipped ton. Shipping costs are then added in an identical
manner to that of corn stover (Table 3.2).

Table 3.2 Raw Material and Transportation Costs for Harvested Crops and Shipped
Product.
Billion-ton Projection
Conservative Estimate
Corn Stover Switchgrass
Corn Stover Switchgrass
Seeding and establishment
0
4.51
0
4.51
Equipment cost ($/
1.86
1.31
1.86
1.31
Fertilizer/herbicide costs ($/
15.63
15.41
15.63
15.41
Harvest costs ($/ harvested
5.25
2.88
4.85
2.88
Handling costs (net wrap)
3.97
3.97
3.97
3.97
Storage ($/ harvested dry
0.11
0.09
0.11
0.09
Land rent ($/ harvested dry
0
14.00
0
14.00
Total raw material cost ($/
26.83
42.17
26.43
42.17
Storage losses (loss %)
8.4%
8.4%
8.4%
8.4%
Profit (% of raw material
15%
15%
15%
15%
pk: Total raw material cost
33.68
52.95
33.18
52.95
sk: Shipping costs, fixed ($/
2.1962
1.8919
2.4466
1.8919
f : Freight costs, variable ($/
0.1498
0.1498
0.1498
0.1498
Data Sources: Raw material costs for corn stover and switchgrass, as well as shipping charges
and storage/transportation losses, are taken from a concurrent Purdue University working paper
(Brechbill and Tyner, 2008). All costs account for residence times of harvesting, storage, and
transportation.

Because transportation costs are based on the mileage between a farm in one
county and a potential manufacturing site in another county, the distances between
counties are required as part of the optimization problem. In this analysis, the distances
between county seats are utilized as a proxy for transportation distances. Latitude and
longitude coordinates were obtained for each county seat using arcGIS. Using these
measures, the Haversine formula was implemented to determine the distance between
county seats on the globe (Sinnott, 1984). Given that this method would produce no
shipping charges for transit within a county, a distance of 10 miles is assumed for intracounty transportation.
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As previously mentioned, a cost factor Cp is added for each facility, with the value
equaling zero for a 100 Mgal plant and positive for a 50 Mgal plant. This factor
represents the added cost of producing at a low output level and not taking advantage of
the economies of scale. For instance, when producing ethanol from corn, the savings in
capital expenditure is calculated to be on the order of $0.23 or greater when doubling the
plant size from 50 to 100 million gallons (Tyner and Dale, 2006). Since Cp is included as
an annual operating cost, it will have to be converted to a capital cost by implementing a
financial analysis similar to those performed on corn ethanol plants. Specifically, what
level of capital savings provides the same net present value (NPV) benefit as saving the
added cost of Cp by operating at a larger level? Assumptions for the financial analysis
are listed in Table 3.3.

Table 3.3 Assumptions for Financial Analysis to Annualize Economies of Scale Which
Would Cover Increased Shipping Distances Associated with Larger Plant Sizes.
Assumption
Project years
Start up years/operating years
1st / 2nd year capital investment split

Value

25

2/23
40% / 60%

Investment hurdle rate (real)
8.7%
Data Sources: Assumptions taken from dry mill model (Dale and Tyner, 2006).

It is expected that if Cp is set to zero for a 50 million gallon facility (i.e., no
economies of scale), that only small facilities will be used in an attempt to spread
production more broadly over the state and minimize shipping distances. As Cp increases,
the ideal spatial distribution of facilities should include some larger plants as the benefits
of running a large scale operation would outweigh the costs of longer shipping routes.
Thus, the model will be optimized over various levels of Cp to determine at what level of
diseconomy of size makes it preferable to utilize larger plants, either occasionally or
throughout the state.
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3.4

Results

The increase in capital expenditure needed to make large plant sizes economical is
modest (Table 3.4). At a total capital investment (TCI) level just under $0.07 per gallon,
at least three large plants are needed to minimize costs. Increasing TCI in very small
increments results in optimized scenarios with more and more large plants until costs are
minimized by operating as many large plants as possible (ten to be exact) at TCI levels of
almost $0.17 / gallon and higher.

Table 3.4 Operating Cost Savings and Their Economy of Scale Equivalents Which Lead
to the Transition from 50 Million Gallon Facilities to 100 Million Gallon Facilities for the
Production of Cellulose Source Ethanol.
Economy of scale*
Target number of
Target number of
Operating costs,
Cjp
in capital investment
100 Mgal plants,
100 Mgal plants,
($/gal ethanol)
($/gal ethanol)
high IN output
moderate IN output
$0.000
$0.000
0
0
$0.003
$0.034
0
0
$0.006
$0.067
3
0
$0.009
$0.101
5
0
$0.012
$0.134
8
0
$0.015
$0.168
10
1
$0.018
$0.201
10
2
$0.021
$0.235
10
2
$0.024
$0.268
10
3
$0.027
$0.302
10
3
$0.030
$0.335
10
4
$0.033
$0.369
10
4
$0.036
$0.402
10
4
*Note: Economies of scale for ethanol from corn are over $0.23 / gallon based on scaling up from
a 50 Mgal facility to a 100 Mgal facility (Dale and Tyner, 2006).

Based on this cost minimization approach, a large number of counties chosen for
the biochemical production of ethanol from cellulose sources (corn stover and
switchgrass) are located in the top half of the state independent of the economies of scale.
As Figure 3.1 demonstrates, when no economies of scale are assumed, all ethanol is
produced using 50 million gallon plants, a majority of which are located in the northern
half of Indiana, with roughly one third being located in the southern half (using
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Indianapolis in Marion County as an unofficial dividing line between the two halves).
While the counties are spread out within regions, there are still several instances of
neighboring counties having facilities, especially in the northwest region of the state.
Several plant locations in the northwest tend to be the lowest cost operations in the state
(Figure 3.1).

Lowest cost plants using the
highest percentage of corn

Highest cost plants using the
highest percentage of

Ɣ50 Mgal plants (21)
Ŷ0JDOSODQWV 

Figure 3.1 Optimal Counties of Manufacturing Sites for the Biochemical Conversion of
Corn Stover, Switchgrass, and Poplar to Ethanol Based on Billion-Ton Study Projections
and No Economies of Scale.

With respect to crop usage, there is a strong correlation between corn stover use
and cost. As demonstrated by Table 3.5, which ranks the counties by corn stover use, the
top five plants with respect to reducing costs all utilize the highest levels of corn stover.
In fact, the ranking of cost reduction is almost identical to the ranking of corn stover
usage, with plants incurring greater costs as they switch from corn stover to switchgrass.
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In fact, the highest cost plants are the three plants located in the southwest portion of the
state (Figure 3.1) and are the only three plants to use over 60% switchgrass.

Table 3.5 Cost Ranking and Biomass Percentages for Each Plant Site Based on Cost
Minimization Procedure: Billion-Ton Assumptions without Economies of Scale
Low cost % ethanol from % ethanol from
Plant location ranking*

corn stover#

switchgrass

Marshall
2
99%
1%
Porter
4
97%
3%
White
3
97%
3%
Newton
1
95%
5%
Miami
5
94%
6%
Shelby
6
85%
15%
Tipton
7
83%
17%
Tippecanoe
8
76%
24%
Boone
9
76%
24%
Randolph
10
64%
36%
Lagrange
11
63%
37%
Montgomery
13
61%
39%
Wells
12
59%
41%
Whitley
16
51%
49%
Delaware
15
51%
49%
Fountain
14
49%
51%
Fayette
17
48%
52%
Clay
18
41%
59%
Knox
19
38%
62%
Vanderburgh
20
24%
76%
Jackson
21
24%
76%
* 1 is the lowest cost plant and 21 is the highest cost plant.
# While plants using close to 90% or higher of corn stover are likely to operate
with this single input, no such restriction was placed on the model.

This trend carries over into the larger economies of scale scenario in which as
many plants as possible are of the large variety (Figure 3.2). In this scenario, the top four
plants in corn stover use are in northwest portion of the state. The two highest cost plants
are located in the southwest and utilize significant levels of switchgrass.
By relaxing some of the assumptions from the Billion-ton study, less cellulosic
biomass is produced and collected in each county, resulting in a drop of total ethanol
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produced in Indiana. In this case, the highest cost and lowest cost plants are located in
the same regions as the base case with the low cost plants still using mostly corn stover
and the high cost plants using the most switchgrass (Figures 3.3 and 3.4). However, with
the lower density of cellulosic biomass materials, greater economies of scale are required
to allow for large plant sizes to be produced. While economies of scale of $0.17 / gallon
ethanol allow for most plants to be converted to 100 Mgal facilities in the base case, this
value only allows firms operating under conservative assumptions to consider such
facilities in the low cost regions, with the full conversion to 100 Mgal facilities occurring
at $0.33 / gallon ethanol (Table 3.4).

Lowest cost plants using the
highest percentage of corn

Highest cost plants using the
highest percentage of

Ɣ50 Mgal plants (1)
Ŷ0JDOSODQWV 

Figure 3.2 Optimal Counties of Manufacturing Sites for the Biochemical Conversion of
Corn Stover and Switchgrass to Ethanol Based on Billion-Ton Study Projections and
Economies of Scale.
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Lowest cost plants using the
highest percentage of corn

Highest cost plant using the
highest percentage of
switchgrass

Ɣ50 Mgal plants (9)
Ŷ0JDOSODQWV 

Figure 3.3 Optimal Counties of Manufacturing Sites for the Biochemical Conversion of
Corn Stover, Switchgrass, and Poplar to Ethanol Based on Conservative Total Yield
Estimates and No Economies of Scale.
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Lowest cost plant using the
highest percentage of corn

Highest cost plant using the
highest percentage of

Ɣ50 Mgal plants (1)
ŶMgal plants (4)

Figure 3.4 Optimal Counties of Manufacturing Sites for the Biochemical Conversion of
Corn Stover and Switchgrass to Ethanol Based on Conservative Total Yield Estimates
and Economies of Scale.

3.5

Discussion

The State of Indiana has a large potential for producing biomass sources
containing cellulose, which can be biochemically converted to ethanol. This analysis
optimizes the overall utilization costs of these biomass resources through the selection of
optimal plant locations and sizes. However, this analysis is really a two-step
optimization problem. The first step is performed by the Billion-ton study, in which land
utilization is optimized based on crop potentials and current land use. For instance, since
switchgrass is not a residue but a primary crop, its production requires ground preparation,
seeding, and land rental fees making it more costly to grow than corn stover which is a
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residue of corn. Currently it would be foolish to grow switchgrass on land capable of
producing corn, as both corn and corn stover can be used to produce ethanol. Therefore,
switchgrass would be chosen for lands less economically suited for producing corn.
These factors are taken into account in the land utilization choices of the Billion-ton
study, which are therefore taken as a given, having already balanced the trade-offs
between costs and benefits. While there are likely still arguments to be made for
alternate land utilization strategies, they should not affect the general conclusions of this
analysis.
From the analysis presented here, it is clear that current costs would dictate a high
concentration of facilities within corn stover producing areas. There is ample corn stover
in the northwest to support a proportionally large number of facilities, regardless of the
assumptions. In areas where the land is better suited to growing switchgrass and corn
stover is in short supply, raw material costs are higher due to the added costs of
establishing, seeding, and renting the land. The facilities projected for two counties in
the highlighted region of the southwest are prime examples, with the highest switchgrass
level usage, very low corn stover farm yields, and the highest cost facilities.
If the assumed cellulosic source yields from the Billion-ton study hold true, it is
likely large plant sizes of 100 million gallons or more will minimize costs. The model
predicts that economies of scale for TCI above $0.17 / gallon ethanol would provide a
sufficient incentive to outweigh increased shipping costs, and economies of scale for corn
are at least $0.23 / gallon ethanol. Assuming that technological developments lead
researchers to enzymes which can chemically break down cellulosic materials into
fermentable sugars, the actual process differences between corn and cellulose conversion
are (1) preparation of the material for the enzymatic conversion and (2) processing and
use of the by-products. If neither of these cause large differences in the cost structures
for corn and cellulosic conversion, and assuming that yields are high enough to match the
Billion-ton study projections, then there likely would be more larger plants as suggested
in Figure 3.2. However, another unknown is whether or not there will be diseconomies
of scale due to the requirement for handling very large amounts of cellulosic materials.
For example, a 100 million gallon plant with a yield of 70 gallons per ton operating 360
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days per year 24 hours per day would need 3968 tons of raw material per day. Using 13
ton trucks, that amounts to over 300 trucks per day or 12 per hour (Popp and Hogan).
To the degree that the assumptions of the Billion-ton study do not hold true, the
results of the conservative scenario may be more applicable for predicting the spatial
distribution and size of plants. For instance, if no-till methods are not implemented or a
significant proportion of land owners do not employ their land in the production and
harvesting of cellulosic biomass, then economies of scale of a 100 Mgal facility may not
be sufficient to cover the costs associated with the larger shipping distances which would
be required to collect material. In this scenario, if economies of scale were similar to
corn, it is likely that one or two large plants could be supported in the corn stover rich
part of Indiana, with smaller plants filling out the rest of the state (Table 3.4).
An assumption was made pertaining to the robustness of manufacturing facilities
and their ability to handle various proportions of the two major biomass sources. It may
turn out that facilities are constructed to handle only a single biomass feedstock.
However, this should not alter the main conclusions presented here. A firm wanting to
convert only corn stover would most likely locate in the northwestern part of the state
where corn stover supplies are ample, while a firm focusing on switchgrass conversion
would likely locate in the south. All the crops should still be utilized based on the
assumption that ethanol prices are high enough to yield any facility operator a positive
profit, regardless of the crop type used. Producers utilizing higher cost crops would
simply have lower profits.
Finally, the issue of naming specific counties as being “ideal” for ethanol
production facilities could be misleading. Other than anticipated crop yields and
distances between counties, no data was collected on any distinguishing characteristics of
the counties such as infrastructure, local government incentives, or industrial zoning. A
small change in raw material production costs or shipping charges could easily shift the
ideal location for a facility into a neighboring county. The important conclusions here
pertain to the quantity and spatial distribution of plants within certain regions of the state
and the costs of operating in those regions more than the exact counties where sites might
be located in the future. Additionally, as switchgrass and other primary cellulosic
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sources continue to be developed and optimized for the specific purpose of ethanol
production, further shifts in ideal plant locations are likely to occur.

3.6
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CHAPTER 4. AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF HARD AND SOFT
PRICE CEILINGS IN EMISSIONS PERMIT MARKETS

4.1

Abstract

Tradable emissions permits have been implemented to control pollution levels in
various markets and represent a major component of legislative efforts to control
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Because permits are supplied for a fixed level of
pollution, allowing the market for permits to determine the price, price control
mechanisms may be needed to protect firms from price spikes caused by fluctuations in
the demand for permits. We test permit markets in an experimental laboratory setting to
determine the effectiveness of several price control mechanisms, with special attention on
the soft price ceiling. We focus on a static setting similar to some of the earliest
experimental work focused on price ceilings. Results indicate that both permit supply
adjustments and price ceilings (hard ceilings) effectively limit elevated prices in this
setting. By contrast, reserve auctions to implement soft ceilings do not consistently
control prices, especially when a minimum reserve permit price is applied. Furthermore,
the grandfathering of permits allows permit sellers to realize significant welfare gains at
the expense of buyers under a soft ceiling policy. Our results thus highlight several
advantages of hard ceilings for controlling short term price increases.

49
4.2

Introduction

Emissions permit markets have been established for many pollutants to
control environmental degradation. In such markets, a government supplies a fixed
level of permits and firms must obtain and report permits equaling their pollution
level at the time of demonstrating compliance each period. To minimize costs in a
competitive emissions market, firms purchase permits at a price equal to their
marginal cost of abatement, so that all firms have the same marginal cost of the last
unit abated. In theory, this minimizes the total cost of achieving the target level of
emissions abatement.
Price controls have been considered in many pollution markets to manage the
price fluctuations of permits. Policies which introduce permits into the market at a
fixed quantity corresponding to the level of pollution allowed in the market can
contribute to large price volatility (Fankhauser and Hepburn, 2010). This is due to
the inelastic supply of government policies that fix the permit level. Any shocks to
the marginal cost of abatement will cause fluctuations in the demand for permits.
Given a controlled quantity of permits, and therefore perfectly inelastic supply, any
fluctuations in demand for pollution abatement are realized through adjustments to
the market price and not quantity.
The purpose of price controls is to introduce elasticity in the supply curve
over the range of non-zero prices, mitigating the effects of shocks or unexpected
shifts in the cost of pollution abatement on permit prices. Typical controls involve
the use of a price collar, which combines a ceiling and a floor. Price ceilings help
firms to avoid exorbitant costs associated with price spikes due to volatility or
aggressive abatement targets. Price floors stimulate investment in emissions
abatement technologies in an environment where low prices provide an insufficient
incentive, thus encouraging lower emissions levels in the future (Burtraw et al., 2010).
Based on simulations with stochastic emissions, Fell and Morgenstern (2010)
demonstrate under various banking and borrowing rules that a price collar is
consistently more cost-effective than a price ceiling alone. 1

1

This conclusion assumes that policies are compared for equal expected accumulative emissions.
Because the price floor decreases the number of permits utilized with the price collar, simulations
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In the context of greenhouse gas (GHG) legislation in the United States,
various price collars have been proposed that are only differentiated by their ceilings.
Each policy has a hard price floor, not allowing purchases of permits below a
minimum price. The various ceilings, however, fall into one of two policy definitions:
hard ceilings which set an absolute maximum on permit prices and soft ceilings
which introduce a minimally priced reserve of permits into the market beyond the
original target quantity. The former provides absolute price control with some
emissions flexibility while the latter provides absolute emissions control while
allowing prices to fluctuate beyond the soft ceiling level.
Laboratory experiments have been used to investigate a broad range of cost
and price control mechanisms to manage price volatility in permit markets. 2 For
example, Cason and Gangadharan (2006) find that banking diminishes price volatility
in the presence of emissions shocks. However, emissions are greater when banking is
allowed due to lower permit compliance rates. Stranlund et al. (2011) extend this
analysis by explicitly separating compliance and reporting violations as two separate
events. They find that enforcement efforts should focus on untruthful reporting since
large fines applied directly to non-compliance of emissions have little effect. In
either case, banking of permits allows subjects to allocate permits reasonably well
over time, even in the presence of non-compliance. Stranlund et al. (2014) consider
the ability of banking and hard ceilings to dampen volatility, finding that both tools
are capable of individually controlling price volatility, even though the hard ceiling
contributes most of the dampening effect when the two are implemented in tandem.
A broad and comprehensive set of experiments would test both hard and soft
ceilings in a dynamic setting, with various combinations of banking and enforcement
mechanisms, in order to compare the degree of price control in the presence of permit
supply or demand shocks. However, given the limited study of the soft ceiling
proposal, and the lack of any experimental research on this policy, this study begins

testing only the price ceiling were provided with a more limited number of permits to equalize
expected emissions. In this context, the higher cost induced by the price floor was outweighed by the
higher cost of a more restrictive permit allotment when testing the price ceiling alone.
2
Cason (2010) provides a comprehensive outline of various experimental evaluations of emissions
permit market structures.
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with a more modest goal of first understanding how the soft ceiling behaves in a
repeated static environment.
Earlier research on hard price ceilings does focus on isolating within-period
price effects to determine if there are any behaviors which would cause deviations
from theory. For instance, a non-binding hard ceiling placed at the equilibrium price
should mathematically produce the same equilibrium outcome as if there were no
ceiling policy. However, researchers have found that a non-binding hard ceiling at
the equilibrium price decreases transaction prices in an experimental double auction
when compared to markets with no price ceiling (Isaac and Plott, 1981, Smith and
Williams, 2008, Smith and Williams, 1981). This effect is strongest in the initial
periods and for subjects with less trading experience, with outcomes featuring welfare
shifts from sellers to buyers of permits. Coursey and Smith (1983) also confirm the
presence of price depression in a posted offer market.
The soft ceiling policy is more complex than a hard ceiling, and yet there are
no analogous experimental studies to determine how subjects will trade within this
new environment, or how trading behavior may deviate from theoretical predictions.
The purpose of this research is to begin to lay the experimental foundation for the soft
ceiling. Specifically, similar to earlier research on the hard ceiling, we focus on the
within-period price and welfare effects of this new policy. We find that under certain
conditions, not only does the soft ceiling lack absolute price control, but prices are
elevated and welfare gains from trade are transferred from buyers to sellers compared
to theoretical predictions. There are also indications that splitting available permits
between an initial and a reserve auction, an essential aspect of the soft ceiling policy,
creates a coordination problem. Subjects do not fully account for the eventual permit
allotment over both auctions, but are instead influenced by the short-term allocation
before both auctions have been conducted.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 4.3 provides
detailed descriptions of both hard and soft ceilings, while section 4.4 describes how
agents may trade when subjected to the soft ceiling policy. Section 4.5 provides the
methodology for the study, and explains the identical theoretical outcomes between
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policy scenarios and the baseline treatment. Section 4.6 presents the results, with
section 4.7 providing a discussion of the implications and policy recommendations.

4.3

Structure of Ceiling Mechanism

A hard price ceiling is simply a price control which sets an absolute maximum
value on permit prices. Assume an initial permit allotment (QI) with an equilibrium
price (PI). When trying to avoid prices higher than a desired maximum (PC), a ceiling
caps prices at Pc and buyers can purchase as many permits as desired at this price
from an unlimited government reserve. When demand is sufficiently high such that
PI > PC, the market price (PM) will rise no higher than PC and the market quantity (QM)
is elevated relative to the initial permit allotment (QI). In such a situation, the price
ceiling is binding, working effectively as an emissions tax (t) with t = PC. By
implementing perfectly elastic supply, a hard ceiling places utmost importance on
controlling prices at the expense of releasing as many permits as required into the
market to keep prices below the ceiling. A notable example of such a price ceiling in
Federal GHG legislation was proposed by Senators Cantwell and Collins (Cantwell,
2009) as part of the Carbon Limits and Energy for America’s Renewal (CLEAR) Act.
This act proposed a hard price ceiling with scheduled annual increases set
automatically as a function of the real discount rate.
By contrast, the soft price ceiling does not set an absolute upper limit on the
price of permits. In fact, the term “soft price ceiling” is not a ceiling by definition,
but the terminology we utilize for a reserve auction of permits with a minimum
reserve price as desribed by Murray, et al. (2009). Fell et al. (2012) have employed
the term “soft collar” when analyzing the effectiveness of a reserve auction in
comparison to a hard collar with an absolute maximum price. Such a reserve auction
was passed in the House of Representatives as part of the permit trading market
proposed in H.R. 2454 by Congressmen Waxman and Markey (Waxman and Markey,
2009). Slightly different structures have been proposed in other policy initiatives,
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including a contingency reserve of unsold allowances which could be a triggered by a
soft ceiling as part of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (Burtraw et al., 2007)
and a more complicated variant with three price tiers established in the California
GHG permit trading scheme (Pavley and Nunez, 2006).
In a permit market with a soft ceiling (Figure 4.1), an initial quantity of
permits (QI) is introduced to the market equal to desired emissions levels. In the
absence of additional permits or controls, the equilibrium price for this initial
allotment would occur at PI. At the time when permit holders are expected to
demonstrate compliance, an additional quantity of permits called the allowance
reserve is offered at auction with a minimum reserve price (PSC), potentially allowing
those with insufficient permits to make up for their shortage. The aggregate of the
initial and reserve auction permits represents a quantity control on the total market
(QC). The introduction of reserve permits as described by Murray et al. (2009), as
well as Waxman and Markey’s legislation, is not induced by a price trigger but is
provided automatically every period. Firms are not bound by the soft price ceiling in
the initial auction and will have reserve permits available regardless of trading prices
earlier in the period.
(a) Demand intersects supply at soft

(b) Demand intersects supply above soft

ceiling
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Auction
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Auction
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Figure 4.1 Controlling High Prices with a Soft Ceiling
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The soft ceiling (PSC) receives its name from the intended impact of the
minimum reserve price on the market price for permits (PM) by introducing supply
elasticity as represented by the horizontal section of the supply curves in Figure 4.1.
If demand were to intersect supply such that PI < PSC, the market price would be equal
to PI and none of the reserve would be purchased. As demand increases, PM increases
until PM = PSC (Figure 4.1a). Under such conditions, firms perfectly coordinating
prices across auctions would purchase permits at the minimum reserve price. In this
way, while there is no absolute maximum, the horizontal portion of supply acts as a
kind of soft ceiling over a range of demands. As demand continues to increase,
however, the market price would eventually rise above the soft ceiling when the
reserve allotment is exhausted (Figure 4.1b). Nonetheless, prices would still be lower
than if there were no reserve at all. This design is appealing to policy-makers
primarily concerned with climate change because unlike hard ceilings it allows for an
absolute cap on emissions (QC), while still providing some, although not absolute,
control of prices.

4.4

Expectations in a Repeated Static Environment

Non-experimental studies comparing the effects of hard and soft ceilings on
prices and total emissions are limited. A macroeconomic analysis of proposed
legislation predicts that permits in the initial market would be purchased at the ceiling
price for many years in order to bank permits in expectation of higher future prices
(Williams, 2010). Fell et al. (2012) perform a dynamic numerical analysis,
comparing the two mechanisms with banking of permits available. When targeting
identical cumulative emissions goals in the presence of shocks to baseline emissions
levels, they find the intuitive result that the hard ceiling decreases price volatility
more than a soft ceiling, and the hard ceiling level required for emissions parity with
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the soft ceiling is higher. 3 While such findings are helpful for policy-makers in
determining the optimal level and pathway for price ceilings, they do not address the
behavior of individual agents who may deviate from theoretical assumptions of how
optimization occurs within a single period of the price discovery process. There are
many types of behavior which could cause markets to deviate from the competitive
equilibria described in Figure 4.1, in which costs are minimized by balancing
marginal costs with the price of permits across both the initial and reserve auctions.
Large deviations could introduce potentially significant consequences with respect to
controlling prices.
For instance, if agents in the initial auction were to ignore reserve auction
permits altogether, and thus price permits based on the initial auction only, one would
expect initial auction prices to equilibrate close to PI. One of the earliest emissions
permit auctions, which regulated SO2 levels under the Clean Air Act, demonstrated
that the spot market was more heavily influenced by current market conditions and
not the anticipated future auction of additional permits (Burtraw et al., 2011). While
this factor may play a role in elevating prices during the earlier periods, the repeated
static nature of the experiment should allow agents to gain experience and more
successfully equilibrate across auctions in later periods as compared to a dynamic
setting.
Another factor which could cause prices to deviate from the competitive
equilibrium is market power. Buyers with market power wanting to avoid prices
above the floor of the reserve auction could withhold demand to depress prices in the
initial auction while sellers with market power wishing to hold out for the reserve
would tend to increase prices. In this set of experiments, as well as for the beginning
years proposed in the Waxman-Markey legislation, sellers could maintain market
power due to extensive grandfathering of permits. Goeree et al. (2010) study the
impacts of grandfathering vs. auctioning initial permit allotments before a singleround, limit-order call market. Agents with large grandfathered permit allocations
strategically withheld permits from the market, generating elevated prices in

3

Fell et al. (2012) study a price collar, which provides a hard price floor in the initial auction in
conjunction with either a hard or soft ceiling.
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comparison to both the theoretical equilibrium and the allotment by auction. Sellers
could exercise similar market power in our experiment, exacerbating the resulting
price elevation above the price floor in the reserve market.
Finally, we expect price increases from the floor of the reserve auction to be
further augmented based on past experimental studies of bidding behavior in the
presence of price floors and ceilings. In the context of a double auction, Smith and
Williams (1981) found that a hard price floor elevated bids of both buyers and sellers
in comparison to non-bound theoretical equilibria at or in close proximity to the price
floor. Sellers with market power able to observe this behavior could construct higher
price expectations for the reserve and revise their bids in the main auction upwards as
a result. For these reasons, we would expect prices to be elevated, and therefore not
controlled, compared to the theoretical equilibrium.

4.5

Methodology

We use an experimental laboratory setting to compare the ability of soft and
hard price ceilings to control prices. To isolate the impact of the soft ceiling, we
consider stationary repetition of identical single period environments (i.e., no banking
or borrowing of permits) and adjust only the price control mechanism across
treatments.
We conduct 16 experimental sessions across four treatments consisting of a
soft ceiling, a reserve auction with no soft ceiling reserve price, a hard ceiling, and a
baseline with no price controls or reserve allocation for comparison. Figure 4.2
depicts the four policy choices tested. In each case, an initial auction of QI permits
yields an equilibrium price of PI, with PI > PT and PT denoting the target maximum
price in the auction for permits. Each policy targets the same price, quantity
combination such that any differences in actual price outcomes are caused by subject
behavior and not policy targets. Starting in the upper left-hand corner of Figure 4.2,
we test the soft ceiling, defined as a reserve auction with the key structural
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components outlined in Waxman and Markey, a reserve floor price and substantial
grandfathering of permits (Soft ceiling). Moving clockwise, we test the same
structure, but relax the minimum price floor in the reserve auction, thus eliminating
the soft ceiling (Reserve auction). We then test increasing the quantity to the same
total cap (QC) as the first two policies, but in a single auction without the use of a
reserve auction (Baseline), providing a control for the other treatments. Finally, we
test a hard price ceiling (PC) where the ceiling price equals the target price of the
other three policies (Hard ceiling). Due to its straightforward nature, the hard ceiling
treatment was conducted in only 1 of the 16 sessions, which allowed us to confirm
that prices readily converged to the ceiling price and to dedicate experimental
earnings more heavily towards the other treatments.
We employed 8 subjects per session for a total of 128 subjects
recruited from the population of undergraduate students at Purdue University with no
prior experience in experiments related to emissions permit markets. In addition to a
$5.00 show-up fee, subjects earned experimental dollars which were converted
immediately to U.S. Dollars at the conclusion of their experimental session. Average
total earnings were $26.69, with a standard deviation of $6.37.
Subjects were provided the opportunity to manage a firm with an existing
level of pollution and a fixed revenue stream. They were incentivized, through
monetary payments, to minimize costs while accounting for all pollution through
some combination of abatement and permit purchases. While this research focuses
on pollution abatement, subjects did not view any environmental terminology. For
example, the level of abatement of pollution was written as “units of an experimental
good produced” and emissions permits were called “coupons.” All experiments were
conducted over a computerized network, with subjects interacting in markets through
a client interface programmed in Z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
For each session, 8 subjects participated in 14 identical and separate periods,
the first 2 of which were practice with no payment. Within each period, all subjects
were required to abate up to 10 units of pollution with increasing marginal costs of
abatement or obtain permits to substitute for pollution not abated. At the end of each
period, the sum of permits held and pollution abated were required to equal 10 under
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a rule of automatic compliance. Each subject had a unique set of marginal costs,
which when aggregated together determined the market demand for permits as
illustrated in Figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.2 Four Policy Treatments Tested as Price Controls in an Experimental
Market.
For all treatments, 40 permits were distributed to the market in each period,
with half being distributed before the initial auction and half before the reserve
auction. (The one exception occurred in the Baseline treatment in which all permits
were distributed before a single auction.) While a typical soft ceiling design would
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likely distribute a smaller proportion of the permit allotment in the reserve, we
distributed 50% in order to increase the disparity between equilibrium prices with and
without the reserve, and thus magnify behavioral effects on prices in our experimental
market setting. The predicted equilibrium price in the initial auction is $123. A
successful price control would decrease the price in the initial auction down to a new
equilibrium of $85 as shown in Figure 4.3.

Figure 4.3 Demand and Supply for Permits in Emissions Market (Soft Ceiling).
After initial permits were allocated, subjects were free to purchase and sell
permits with each other in a double auction. We used this method to simulate the
heavy grandfathering of permits built into the early years of the Waxman and Markey
legislation. We utilized a continuous double auction trading institution similar to
Cason and Gangadharan (2006) in which any subject could continuously make or
accept single permit price bids for both selling and purchasing of permits.
Experimental instructions for all treatments are provided in the appendices. We
posted all price ceilings and floors at the top of the screen during trading, both for the
initial auction and the future reserve auction when applicable.
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After completing the initial auction, reserve permits were distributed (except
for the baseline treatment which ended at this point in each period). Subjects then
traded permits again using a double auction similar to the first phase of the period.
We used the same trading procedures after grandfathering reserve permits for two
reasons: (1) the auction format already placed a high level of cognitive demand on
subjects, and learning two completely different auction formats would have added
unnecessary complexity; and (2) substantial grandfathering of permits is common
during initial years of many permit trading schemes in the field. For both the initial
and reserve allocations, permits were heavily distributed towards the 4 lowest cost
abaters to induce a high volume of trading and create liquid markets.

4.6

Results

We have implemented four treatments designed to achieve equal emissions
levels and target the same equilibrium price in order to determine the effectiveness of
a soft and hard ceiling in maintaining a maximum price. We test a hard ceiling
treatment, a soft ceiling treatment, as well as a reserve auction only treatment against
our control, the baseline treatment in which the reserve amount is added to the initial
auction, and the target equilibrium price.

4.6.1

Prices in the Main (Initial) Auction

Result 1: The hard ceiling controls prices, with market prices converging closely to
the target equilibrium price.
Support: Figure 4.4 displays the mean trading prices, indicating that the hard ceiling
price quickly approaches the maximum target of $85 by the eighth period and
averages $84.6 over the final five periods. Since the hard ceiling effectively achieves
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the objectives of controlling the price at the target, this treatment serves as a useful
benchmark against which to evaluate other treatments.
Figures 4.4 and 4.5 demonstrate that the hard ceiling treatment price
converges on the target of $85.0, with the average market price in the final two
periods equaling the ceiling price exactly. Past research assessing price ceilings in
experimental markets has demonstrated eventual convergence of price with the
ceiling under certain conditions, with more experienced subjects converging more
quickly (Isaac and Plott, 1981). Our subject pool was drawn from students with no
experience in emissions permit markets, and showed convergence speed
commensurate with inexperienced subjects in other studies.

Figure 4.4 Mean of Last 8 Trades in Initial Auction for Each Period (All Sessions)
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Figure 4.5 Mean of Last 8 Trades in Initial Auction for Last 5 Periods (All Sessions)
Result 2: In the baseline treatment with no price controls, prices attain the
equilibrium price when the entire permit supply is provided in a single auction.
Support: Table 4.1 reports Wilcoxon Signed Rank tests, a non-parametric test which
compares the average initial auction price over the last 5 periods for each session to
the target equilibrium price (85). For the baseline treatment this test does not reject
the null hypothesis that mean prices equal the equilibrium level.
Table 4.1 p-Values for Main Auction Treatment Comparisona
(Non-Parametric Mann-Whitney Test and Wilcoxon Signed Rank Testb)
Treatment
Mean price, $/permit (std err)
vs. Reserve Auction
vs. Baseline
vs. Equilibrium (85)

Soft

Reserve

Ceiling

Auction

Baseline

103.0 (2.9)

91.5 (8.8)

76.3 (4.5)

0.548
0.008***

0.310

0.062*

0.438

a Session means based on final 8 trades of initial auction over each of the last 5 periods.
b The Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test is only used for comparisons to equilibrium.
* significant at 10%
***significant at 1%

0.188
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While non-parametric tests utilize data from the last 5 periods of each session,
such tests do not differentiate data between periods. Therefore, any information
regarding experience gained and its impact on mean and error correlations across
periods is lost. Additionally, information from the first 7 periods is excluded. Given
the visual evidence in Figures 4.4 and 4.5, which indicates that prices may still be
decreasing slightly over time for the reserve auction and soft ceiling treatments, it is
desirable to adopt a model which can differentiate estimates of prices in the initial
auction for each period. Specifically, we adopt a model introduced by Noussair et al.
(1995) and utilized in several applications to test for convergence of adjusting prices
in experimental markets (Cason and Noussair, 2007). For each treatment i, Table 4.2
provides estimates for the mean price in the main auction for the first period with no
experience (ȕi1), for the end of session period based upon the price to which the
model converges with maximum experience (ȕi2), and for the change in price over the
course of the experiment. The model is specified as follows:
§ n
·
¨ ¦ Ei1 Di (1/ t )  Ei 2 Di (1  1/ t ) ¸  H jt ,
©i1
¹
where i indexes the treatment, j indexes the session, t indexes the period,
Pricejt ŁPHDQRIWKHODVWSULFHVRIWKHLQLWLDODXFWLRQLQSHULRGWVHVVLRQM
ȕi1 ŁWKHSDUDPHWHUIRUWKHVWDUWLQJSULFHLQWUHDWPHQWL
ȕi2 ŁWKHSDUDPHWHUIRUWKHDV\PSWRWLFSULFHRXWFRPHLQWUHDWPHQWL
Di ŁWKHGXPP\YDULDEOHIRUWUHDWPHQWL, and
ڙjt ŁWKHHUURUWHUPIRUVHVVLRQMLQSHULRGW
Price jt

This model accounts for the time pattern of prices using the terms (1/t) and (1 – 1/t).
In the first period when t = 1, (1 – W  DQGW VRȕi1 provides an estimate for
the price at the start of the markets for treatment i. As t grows larger, (1/t) Æ VRȕi2
provides an estimate for the price outcome approached in the limit for treatment i as t
Æ
Accounting for interdependencies between periods within each session
requires the use of panel data regression methods. We define each of the 15
experimental sessions (excluding the single session testing the hard price ceiling) as a
data cluster. A generalized linear model procedure is employed which provides
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robust standard errors based on an autoregressive structure to account for correlated
errors within each session.

Table 4.2 Estimates of the Mean Price in the Main Auction for the First Period
(ȕi1, t = 1), the End Period (ȕi2, t Æ   and the Change Across Periodsa,B
Price jt

E11 D1 (1/ t )  E12 D1 (1  1/ t )  E 21 D2 (1/ t )  E 22 D2 (1  1/ t )  E31 D3 (1/ t )  E32 D3 (1  1/ t )  H jt

ȕi1, t = 1

ȕi2, t Æ 

ȕi2 - ȕi1

Mean Price

Mean Price

Price Change

($/permit)

($/permit)

($/permit)

test vs. equilibriumc test vs. equilibrium

test vs. 0

Treatment
Parameter

Soft ceiling
ȕ1.)
Reserve auction
ȕ2.)
Baseline
ȕ3.)

103.1 (2.1)

102.1 (2.4)

-1.0 (2.9)

< 0.001***

< 0.001***

0.733

104.4 (6.9)

90.6 (8.4)

-13.8 (5.4)

0.005***

0.506

0.010***

70.7 (3.0)

81.4 (4.4)

10.7 (5.9)

< 0.001***

0.414

0.069*

a Mean prices and price changes are provided with standard errors in parentheses and p-values below.
b Robust standard errors are assumed based on session level clusters with an autoregressive
correlation structure.
c p-values for estimates of the mean price are for tests against an equilibrium price of 85.
* significant at 10%
***significant at 1%

Table 4.2 shows WKDWWKHEDVHOLQHWUHDWPHQWȕi2 estimate for asymptotic prices
(t Æ) is 81.4, which is not significantly different from the equilibrium prediction of
85 (p-value=0.414). With experience, we cannot reject that subjects achieve the
competitive equilibrium.
Result 3: The reserve auction alone appears to control prices to equilibrium after
subjects have had time for price discovery. However, prices are elevated above
equilibrium at the beginning of the price discovery process.
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Support: For the Reserve Auction treatment, Table 4.1 shows a comparison of mean
prices averaged over the last 5 periods for each session to the equilibrium prediction
of 85 using the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test and to the baseline treatment using the
non-parametric Mann-Whitney Test. No significant difference in the main auction
prices is detected when compared to the equilibrium or the baseline treatment. The
asymptotic price estimate of 90.6 (Table 4.2) can also not be rejected as being
equivalent to the equilibrium price (p-value=0.506) or the baseline treatment (pvalue=0.333, Table 4.3).
In the early periods of the reserve auction treatment, prices are elevated (104.4)
compared to the equilibrium (Table 4.2), rejecting the null hypothesis that first period
prices equal the target price of 85 (p-value=0.005). As subjects gain experience, the
prices decrease significantly (p-value=0.010) to 90.6. Thus, while the reserve auction
alone does not provide absolute control of prices over all periods, it yields prices that
are not significantly different from the competitive equilibrium once subjects have
gained experience across trading periods.

Table 4.3 Comparing Estimates of the Main Auction Mean Price across Treatments
ȕi2, t Æ 
Treatment
Mean price, $/permit (std err)
vs. Reserve auction

a

Soft ceiling
102.1 (2.4)

Reserve auction

Baseline

90.6 (8.4) 81.4 (4.4)

11.6 (8.7)
0.186

vs. Baseline

20.7 (5.0)

9.2 (9.5)

< 0.001***

0.333

a Differences between means are provided with standard errors in parentheses and pvalues below.
***significant at 1%

The reserve auction treatment increases the complexity of the baseline in that
cost minimization efforts must be balanced across two separate auctions. These

66
results indicate that for experienced subjects, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the
reserve auction can effectively control prices in the main auction.
Result 4: The soft price ceiling does not control prices as intended in the main auction.
Prices are above equilibrium for both early and late periods.
Support: Non-parametric tests reject the null hypotheses that the soft ceiling price is
equivalent to either the equilibrium price or the baseline treatment price (Table 4.1).
Price estimates of the soft ceiling design are significantly elevated above the
equilibrium price both for early and late periods (Table 4.2). The null hypothesis that
prices are equal to the baseline treatment (Table 4.3, p-value < 0.001) is clearly
rejected. Price estimates also do not change significantly over time (Table 4.2, pvalue = 0.733).

4.6.2

Session Price Trends and Reserve Auction Prices

The data indicate that the hard ceiling controls prices in the main auction to
the competitive equilibrium while the soft ceiling does not. However, there is still
some uncertainty regarding how well the reserve auction alone actually controls
prices, even though we cannot reject price control for this treatment. Recall from
Table 4.2 that no statistically significant difference exists between prices in the main
auction and the equilibrium price in either the baseline or the reserve auction only
treatments. When analyzing transaction prices in individual sessions for each of these
two treatments, some have prices predominantly below equilibrium while some have
prices predominantly above. Only in the soft ceiling treatment do we observe average
period prices consistently above the equilibrium price for all sessions. Therefore, the
ability of sellers to consistently trade permits above equilibrium in the main auction
must be attributable to the reserve auction having a price floor as in the soft ceiling
design.
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Result 5: The minimum reserve price of the soft ceiling increases trading prices in the
reserve auction.
Support: Table 4.4 reports price estimates generated for the reserve auction using the
same regression techniques as in the main auction. Reserve prices with a floor in the
soft ceiling design are 96.0, significantly higher than equilibrium (p-value < 0.001).
Reserve prices without a floor were not significantly different than equilibrium (pvalue = 0.818).
Given that sellers receive better prices in the reserve auction and consistently
better prices in the main auction with the soft ceiling design, it is useful to determine
whether higher prices translate to improved welfare outcomes for sellers.

Table 4.4 Estimates of the Mean Price in the Reserve Auction ȕi2, t Æ 
and Comparison to Equilibriuma
Treatment

Soft ceiling

Reserve auction only

Mean price, $/permit (std err)

96.0 (2.1)

86.7 (7.3)

vs. Equilibrium (85)

11.0 (2.1)

1.7 (7.3)

< 0.001***

0.818

a Differences are provided with standard errors in parentheses and p-values below.
***significant at 1%

4.6.3

Welfare Gains from Trade

Recall that permits were more heavily allocated to the 4 traders with low
marginal costs of abatement in order to create a thicker market. Such traders became
net sellers of permits while the other 4 traders with small initial permit allotments
became net buyers. For each period, a subject’s welfare gains are calculated as:
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Revenue from permits sold – Marginal abatement costs realized from selling
permits
– Cost of permits purchased + Marginal abatement costs avoided from buying
permits
Welfare gains differ from total profits in that they do not include fixed period
revenues or initial abatement costs before trading. Thus, welfare gains are completely
determined by the trading decisions of subjects.
In an efficient market for this experimental environment, net buyers would
purchase enough permits at the equilibrium price (85) to avoid any marginal
abatement costs above this price. Similarly, net sellers would sell enough permits at
the equilibrium price to incur any marginal costs below this price. The theoretical
welfare gains for such an efficient market can be calculated for the aggregate of net
sellers and net buyers separately. The proportion of efficient welfare gains realized is
determined by calculating the ratio of actual realized welfare gains to theoretical
efficient welfare gains. Note that this proportion can be greater than 1. For instance,
if net buyers are able to consistently purchase permits below the equilibrium price,
they could realize welfare gains greater than the efficient level at the expense of net
sellers.
Result 6: The soft ceiling policy allows net sellers of permits to realize greater
welfare gains than efficient levels at the expense of net buyers.
Support: The same regression model and panel data methods used to analyze prices
are also used for welfare analysis, with the proportion of efficient welfare gains
replacing average price as the dependent variable. We are interested in the end period
welfare gain estimates corresponding to the auction price estimates in Tables 4.3 and
4.4 ȕi2, t Æ  after subjects have gained experience. Table 4.5 shows that under the
soft ceiling, net sellers realize welfare gains 1.31 times the efficient level based on the
asymptotic estimate for this model. This is consistent with the high prices observed
for this treatment and significantly different at the 5% level and 1% level than the
proportions for the reserve auction (0.87) and baseline (0.82) treatments respectively.
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As deadweight losses for the soft ceiling are not statistically different than the other
two treatments (ranging from 0.14 to 0.20), this large welfare gain occurs at the
expense of net buyers, who realize a gain of only 0.5 times their efficient level. 4 This
low realized gain for net buyers in the soft ceiling treatment is significantly different
at the 1% level from the proportions for the baseline (0.91) treatment.

Table 4.5 Comparison of Welfare Gains from Trade for End of Session ȕi2, t Æ 
Treatment
Proportion efficient gain (std err)

a

Soft ceiling

Reserve auction

Baseline

1.31 (0.05)

0.87 (0.21)

0.82 (0.12)

-0.44 (0.22)

-0.49 (0.13)

0.044**

< 0.001***

0.74 (0.14)

0.91 (0.05)

0.24 (0.16)

0.41 (0.09)

0.139

< 0.001***

Sellers
Difference vs. soft ceiling
Sellers
0.50 (0.07)

Proportion efficient gain (std err)
Buyers
Difference vs. soft ceiling
Buyers

a Differences between means are provided with standard errors in parentheses and one sided pvalues below.
** significant at 5%
***significant at 1%

4.7

Discussion

A hard ceiling provides an absolute maximum for prices, allowing the number
of permits, and therefore the amount of emissions, to increase as much as needed
when prices hit the ceiling. Some scientists, economists, and policy-makers have
advocated for reserve auctions and soft ceiling designs, which have the desirable
property of placing an absolute cap on emissions levels, while still providing some

4

Deadweight losses are a proportion of efficient welfare gains from trade that go unrealized, and are
considerably smaller when reported as a proportion of efficient total profits.
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level of price control. A hard price ceiling could increase emissions considerably if
the market price consistently hits the ceiling.
We have demonstrated that while a hard price ceiling can act as an effective
price control, the soft ceiling fails to control prices to theoretical predictions under the
conditions of our experiment. The evidence points to the presence of the minimum
reserve price as the culprit for elevated prices in the main auction. The
grandfathering of permits, in conjunction with the guaranteed minimum price in the
reserve auction, allows net sellers to strengthen negotiating power in this multilateral
trading institution, which translates to higher trading prices and greater welfare gains
to sellers.
Previous research has also shown that the grandfathering of permits elevates
prices compared to the direct auctioning of permits by the government (Goeree et al.,
2010). In the reserve auction without a price floor, traders eventually converged on
the equilibrium price. When the price floor was introduced, prices remained
significantly higher than equilibrium. This is partly due to the nature of the soft
ceiling, which does not allow for price deviations below the equilibrium in the reserve
auction. Interestingly, the elevated prices carried over into the main (or initial)
auction even though it places no restrictions on prices. By contrast, when the reserve
had no minimum price, we observed some sessions in which sellers traded below
equilibrium in the main auction and some in which they traded above. Sellers were
not able to consistently elevate prices without the guarantee of the minimum reserve
price. As a result, only in the soft ceiling treatment did sellers achieve significant
welfare gains at the expense of buyers.
Another concern relates to elevated prices in the main auction for
inexperienced subjects. We observed such price increases for both reserve auction
treatments, regardless of the presence of a minimum reserve price. From the data, it
cannot be determined whether high prices are due to inexperience with the trading
mechanism or inexperience with the static demand and supply conditions in the
market. If the latter contributes in any way, this would further hinder the ability of
the soft ceiling to control prices in a dynamic setting.
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Our results raise serious concerns regarding legislation that combines a soft
ceiling design with the grandfathering of permits. This design is not an absolute price
control in theory, and our results indicate that it actually elevates prices compared to
theoretical predictions. If absolute price control is the primary goal, a hard ceiling
would be preferred. Alternatively, if the reserve auction is desired to control the
absolute level of admissions, eliminating the minimum reserve price or the
grandfathering of permits would be beneficial to controlling prices, although more
study is required for verification.
An alternative policy not studied here could provide the best of both worlds.
Such a hybrid policy would utilize a hard price ceiling for short term price stability,
and the ceiling level could be adjusted periodically to achieve cumulative emissions
targets. Unlike other pollutants which may be toxic based on flow levels to the
environment within each period, the deleterious nature of greenhouse gases is
determined by stock amounts within an ecological system. This affords regulators
utilizing a hard ceiling system the flexibility to manage greenhouse gas levels across
periods without extreme concern for emissions spikes within a given period. In such
a system, quantity control adjustments of the hard price ceiling could replace the
discount rate adjustments currently proposed in most legislation. The rule for making
adjustments should be well-defined and clearly communicated so as not to introduce
additional uncertainty to permit markets.
A similar approach has been recommended by Metcalf (2009) for emissions
taxes, with the tax adjusted yearly to a greater or lesser extent as a function of
proximity to cumulative emissions benchmarks. Adjusting a hard price ceiling yearly
using similar criteria would avoid the artificially inflated prices of the soft ceiling
while providing for control of cumulative emissions over time. Furthermore,
allowing the market to set prices within a controlled price range would provide more
information regarding price discovery than Metcalf’s variable tax.
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Appendix A

Spatial Optimization for Cellulosic to Ethanol Facilities in Indiana with
Sequential Start-ups

The model in Chapter 3 is varied in such a way as to minimize costs over a
sequence of ethanol plant start-ups utilizing cellulosic materials. In Chapter 3, costs were
minimized for a network of plants in a social planner’s context, assuming a simultaneous
start-up of the network. By minimizing costs for each plant separately, and assuming a
sequential start-up of facilities, the model should simulate more closely how this industry
would grow in the real world.
Please recall the model from Chapter 3, restated here for ease of reference: The
amount of dry biomass shipped between counties is designated Xijk, where i is the set of
counties where biomass is produced, j is the set of counties where ethanol is potentially
produced, and k is the set of biomass feedstocks (corn stover and switchgrass). The
relevant parameters for the cost minimization model are as follows:
pk – production cost for biomass feedstock k ($/dry ton shipped with profit)
sk – fixed shipping cost for biomass feedstock k ($/dry ton shipped)
f – freight rate for shipping biomass ($/dry ton shipped/mile)
dij – distance from county i to county j (miles)
N – total plant capacity needed (100 Mgal/year)
l – fractional storage loss of biomass feedstock
bik – amount of biomass k produced in county i (dry tons/yr)
ck – million gallons of ethanol per dry ton of biomass
The binary {0,1} variables Ij50 and Ij100 represent the number of 50 million and 100
million gallon ethanol plants respectively in county j, and the model is optimized by
minimizing the total cost C as follows:

min C = ¦¦¦ pk  sk  fd ij xijk  ¦ I 50j C p
50

100

xijk , I j , I j

subject to:

i

j

k

j
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1

100
I 50
¦
j ¦Ij
2
j

(1)

N

j

100
I 50
d 1 for each j
j Ij

¦ xijk d (1  l )bik

(2)

for each k and i

(3)

j

¦¦ ck xijk t 50 I 50j  100 I 100
j
i

for each j

(4)

k

xijk t 0 for each i, j, and k

(5)

I 50
j

0,1 for each j

(6)

I 100
j

0,1 for each j

(7)

The optimization problem has several constraints. Constraints 2, 6, and 7 imply that any
county can have at most one plant of either size, 100 Mgal or 50 Mgal, and that fractional
plants are not permitted. Constraint 1 requires that the total amount of ethanol produced
will exactly exhaust the feedstock resource base. Finally, constraints 3, 4, and 5 require
that the amount of biomass supplied by a county cannot exceed the amount available
from the farms in that county after taking collection/storage losses into account, and the
amount of biomass supplied to each manufacturing site must be sufficient to cover the
production level.
The model is revised by minimizing costs over a sequence of plant start-ups
ordered by time (t), with costs being described by σ( + ݏ + ݂݀ )ݔ௧ for each
plant (t). Therefore, t is the index for both the ordering of plant start-ups and the specific
site that starts up at time t in the ordering. t is indexed from 1 to T, with T being the
number of 50 million gallon manufacturing sites required to use most of the biomass
available in the state of Indiana (see Appendix B for simulation software). Based on low
yield projections, T is equal to 9, resulting in the production of 450 million gallons of
cellulosic ethanol per year.
The other significant revision reduces the amount of biomass available to each
plant by the amount extracted from previous start-ups. The term for total biomass
available, ܾ , is therefore replaced by ܾ௧ . This represents the amount of type k
cellulosic material available in county i for sequential plant start-up t. For t = 1, ܾ௧ is
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simply equal to ܾ from the social planner’s model in Chapter 3. For t > 1, ܾ௧ =
ܾ(௧ିଵ) െ [σ ݔ(௧ିଵ) ]/(1 െ ݈).
With these adjustments, the model predicts the network of plants depicted in
Figure A.1, with the lowest cost sites starting up first in the corn-rich northwest portion
of the state and the highest cost site starting up in the bottom half of the state. These
results do not deviate considerably from the results of the social planner model.

Lowest cost plants use 100%
corn stover

Highest cost plant uses 100%
switchgrass

Ɣ50 Mgal plants
Ŷ0JDOSODQWV

Figure A.1 Sequential Start-Up of Manufacturing Sites for the Biochemical Conversion
of Corn Stover and Switchgrass to Ethanol Based on Low Yield Assumptions and No
Economies of Scale.

Table A.1 ranks the sites by cost and reports the percentage of ethanol produced
from corn stover for each site. For comparison, the social planner model is run with the
assumptions of low yields and 9 sites producing 50 million gallons/yr each. When
minimizing costs over the entire network, every site uses some mixture of the two major
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crops, with low cost sites using mostly corn stover and high cost sites using mostly
switchgrass. Utilizing a sequential start-up assumption results in most sites adopting a
single, dedicated type of biomass, with lost cost sites using only corn stover and high cost
sites using only switchgrass. Therefore, even though the model assumes that plants are
able to use any mixture of the 2 biomass types, adopting a sequential start-up framework
largely negates this requirement as the manufacturing sites tend to self-segregate.

Table A.1 Cost Ranking and Corn Stover Percentages for Each Plant Site Based on Cost
Minimization Procedure: Billion-Ton Assumptions without Economies of Scale
% Ethanol from Corn Stover
Low cost ranking*

Social Planner

Sequential Start-up

1

95%

100%

2

77%

100%

3

69%

100%

4

52%

100%

5

43%

7%

6

36%

9%

7

18%

0%

8

9%

0%

9

17%

0%

* 1 is the lowest cost plant and 9 is the highest cost plant.
In conclusion, having modified the original model in Chapter 3 to accommodate
the sequential start-up of profit maximizing plants, the model predicts that the first sites
to be constructed will be small in scale (50 million gallons/yr or less), built in high yield
corn areas, and utilize 100% corn stover for conversion to ethanol. Only after most of the
corn stover has been exhausted will sites begin to utilize switchgrass, and only if ethanol
revenues can cover the costs of obtaining such an expensive primary crop.
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Appendix B

Links to Software Programs

All computer programs can be located at the following site:
http://web.ics.purdue.edu/~perkis/researchsoftware
Links are organized as follows:

Chapter 1 and Appendix A
• Mixed-integer program for plant location model assuming sequential start-ups

Chapter 2
• DM Model with modifications for pretreated recycle

Chapter 3
• Mixed-integer program for plant location model assuming social planner

Chapter 4
• Soft ceiling experimental software
• Reserve auction experimental software
• Baseline experimental software
• Hard ceiling experimental softwar
.
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Appendix C

Subject Instructions for Soft Ceiling Design
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Subject Instructions for Reserve Auction Design
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Subject Instructions for Baseline Design
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Subject Instructions for Hard Ceiling Design
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to determine the effectiveness of price controls in emissions permit markets. This
research found that some of the more recently developed mechanisms may be ineffective
in hitting theoretical targets under certain conditions (published this year in
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between emissions and energy security objectives in the United States.
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